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Abstract 
 
This thesis provides an analysis of Regional Economic Development Authorities 
(REDAs), which were created by the Saskatchewan government in 1993. It examines the 
political and economic factors that led to the creation of the REDAs; the design of the 
organization and funding framework for the REDAs; the main challenges that REDAs 
face today, and offers recommendations for consideration in the future.  
The thesis reveals that REDAs were created in response to the challenges 
associated with the changing global economy. They were based on the principles of 
Community Economic Development (CED), a grassroots approach that encourages 
individuals in a community to support and facilitate new and existing businesses in order 
to contribute to the strength of a community’s economy. This approach was created with 
the understanding that rather than leading the process, as it had done in the past, the 
government would facilitate the efforts of these organizations through the provision of 
resources and support.  
In an effort to coordinate the CED services being offered in the province, 
REDAs were established on a relatively large regional basis.  Operating as umbrella 
organizations, REDAs both monitor CED efforts in their respective regions and deliver 
them. The Saskatchewan government has positioned itself as a partner, offering financial 
resources that REDAs can rely on and also organizational development and technical 
support.  
The analysis provided in this thesis demonstrates that while CED is a popular 
approach taken by governments at both the federal and provincial level, there must be a 
considerable degree of commitment to the process to be effective. In the case of the 
Saskatchewan government, the capacity of these authorities has been enhanced 
substantially due to the government’s efforts to develop an organizational framework, 
deliver support through education and training in CED, commit to an evaluation 
procedure and provide funding on which the authorities can rely.  
This thesis reveals that the main challenges REDAs face today are largely 
associated with inadequate financial resources.  One of the greatest assets to the 
organizations is the dedication of qualified staff. With increasing workloads however, 
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REDA staff are reaching their limit in terms of what they can accomplish and without 
the financial capability to alleviate these pressures by hiring and retaining talented and 
dedicated staff, the capacity of the CED process becomes significantly restricted.  
This thesis recommends that to ensure the continuing success of REDAs in the 
future the following initiatives should be undertaken. First, the provincial government 
must consider the workload being placed on each REDA. With every new layer of 
responsibility, there must be an equal level of human and financial support. Second, a 
review of the funding formula is necessary. With varying levels of capacity, it is not 
necessary for each REDA to receive equal funding. Finally, if the program is expected to 
improve, an ongoing evaluation procedure, much like the one in place, will continue to 
be necessary.  
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Historical Legacies of Economic Development 
Economic development has been a perennial issue in Saskatchewan. Abating the 
out-migration of people and capital and addressing the decline of small urban and rural 
communities continue to be major concerns for the provincial and municipal 
governments. While encouraging economic growth and sustainability in both rural and 
urban Saskatchewan is a key concern, it is becoming increasingly difficult for 
governments to determine the best approach. Traditionally, the provincial government 
has intervened through the use of fiscal policy, centrally planned investment, 
megaprojects, and economic stimulation programs.1 What has been concluded, however, 
is that these traditional kinds of strategies have resulted in “truly spectacular failures.”2 
It seems that successive Saskatchewan governments have learned some serious lessons 
about governmental strategies to affect the growth of the regional and provincial 
economies.  
 Brett Fairbairn supports this argument in “Economic Development and the New 
Role of Government”. He states that based on the experience of the last few decades 
many of the tools the Saskatchewan government has employed to affect the growth of 
the economy are limited. He illustrates this point through a discussion of the substantial 
investments in the economy, through tax cuts and government spending, by the Grant 
Devine government in the 1980s and the substantial de-investments, through tax 
                                                 
1 Brett Fairbairn, “Economic Development and the New Role of Government,” in Saskatchewan 
Politics into the 21st Century (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 2001), 299. 
2 Ibid., 301. 
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increases and limited government spending by the Roy Romanow government in the 
1990s. During the Devine administration a billion dollars “was borrowed and pumped 
into household budgets, government services, economic development megaprojects, and 
all other areas touched by provincial taxation and spending.”3 Conversely, during the 
Romanow administration, the deficit was made the top priority, resulting in “a billion 
dollars a year … taken out of the provincial economy. Taxes were raised, services 
restricted, creditors paid off.”4 In both instances, Fairbairn writes, the expected outcome 
did not occur. Saskatchewan’s economy did not grow in accordance with billion dollars 
that was pumped into it. Nor did Saskatchewan have an economic contraction or 
recession in the 1990s when a billion dollars a year was taken out.5 Considering this 
Fairbairn writes that this should: 
give pause for thought about the nature and integrity of our economy.  
Apparently, the Saskatchewan economy is so full of “leaks” that wealth 
quickly disperses and disappears, probably beyond the provincial borders. 
The same problem means that the megaprojects of the 1980s brought much 
less benefit to people of the province than their size suggested. Many of the 
benefits flowed to contractors, head offices, managers, or investors based 
elsewhere. The hard reality that provincial governments, and perhaps 
electors, have been reluctant to face, is that billions of dollars spent by 
provincial governments on spending or tax cuts or megaprojects have next to 
no effect on the provincial economy as a whole.6 
 
Addressing rural decline has been equally difficult. Saskatchewan governments 
will often attempt to revitalize rural communities by maintaining schools, recreation 
centers, government offices and hospitals despite declining populations and the limited 
utilization of these facilities. As Fairbairn has indicated however, there is evidence that 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 300. 
4 Ibid., 300.  
5 Ibid., 300. 
6 Ibid., 300. 
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much of Saskatchewan’s wealth flows outside provincial borders. This is similar to 
small rural communities: much of the wealth that flows into the communities also flows 
outside their borders to larger centers or outside the province entirely.7 Leaks such as 
these limit the effectiveness of cash investments from government that attempt to 
maintain the status quo of rural communities. Spending money on a community does 
little to restore the strength or sustainability of its economy and this has led to arguments 
that suggest strategies of this nature are merely attempts at prolonging the inevitable.8  
 The effectiveness of the traditional tools government uses as a means to 
influence the economy are limited. Donald J. Savoie writes that “if recent economic 
history has taught us anything, it is that the two senior levels of government do not 
always have the answers when communities are faced with having to make serious 
economic adjustments.”9 The result is that the “top-down bureaucracy-driven plans for 
regional development have fallen into disrepute and policymakers know they need to 
consider new approaches.”10  
According to Donald J. Savoie, one approach is for the government to stand back 
and allow the ‘invisible hand’ of market forces restore the appropriate economic 
equilibrium. In the long term, as economic circumstances continue to decline, people 
will move to other jobs and other communities. This is considered healthy and 
governments should not intervene to ease the economic misfortune no matter how 
difficult the circumstances may be.11 Savoie criticizes this approach, however, because it 
                                                 
7 Confidential Interview. 
8 Ric Dolphin, “Cry, the beloved country: Our leaders bemoan the trend towards rural 
depopulation, but what can they really do to stop it?” Western Producer 23 January 2006, 50. 
9 Savoie, Donald J. Community Economic Development in Atlantic Canada: False Hope or 
Panacea? (Moncton: Canadian Institute for research on regional Development, 2000),  21. 
10 Ibid., 2-3. 
11 Ibid., 18. 
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“has no recommendation beyond ‘leave the market alone.’”12 He argues that this policy 
of ‘doing nothing’ offers very little to a community and is unlikely to resonate with a 
government faced with the pressure to ‘do something’ about a troubled economy. For 
Savoie, “the question is not so much if governments will intervene, but how they will do 
it.”13 In recent times governments have turned to a new way to intervene, namely 
facilitating and supporting community economic development (CED). 
 
1.2 What is Community Economic Development? 
CED is a term used to describe a broad range of development practices. One of 
the key characteristics of CED is its basis “on a ‘bottom up’ philosophy that relies on 
using the community’s own resources – people, capital, management, creativity and 
pride – to improve economic well-being.”14 While it can include anything from the 
development of industry to neighborhood resource centers, it is primarily concerned 
with, “policies and approaches that develop people in their communities – enhance their 
skills, independence, ability to start and run successful ventures, and ability to work 
together toward common goals.”15 The objective is to take “some measure of control of 
the local economy back from the markets and the state.”16  
What is appealing about CED is that it has the potential, through local effort and 
the coordination of local resources, to strengthen the economy and there are case studies 
that illustrate its potential for success. In “Community Economic Development in 
                                                 
12 Benjamin Higgins and Donald Savoie, Regional Development Theories and Their Application 
(New Brunswick (USA): Transaction Publishers, 1995), 386. 
13  Savoie, 20. 
14 Government of Nova Scotia, “A Discussion Paper on Community Economic Development,” 
(Halifax: Department of Economic Development, 1993), 2. 
15 Brett Fairbairn, “Economic Development and the new role of government,” 309. 
16 Ibid., 309. 
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Atlantic Canada: False Hope or Panacea,” Savoie examines four regions in Atlantic 
Canada and documents their CED experience and the lessons learned. What he found 
was that the CED measures used in each region were able to significantly affect the 
economy. The Kent region, for example, made an economic transformation. Savoie 
writes that “it has made great strides since the days when it was described as the second-
poorest region in Canada, and its progress can be measured by any number of economic 
indicators.”17 Perhaps more importantly, however, is the “can do” mentality that exists in 
the region, which “is in sharp contrast to the economically dependent reputation it has 
long had.18 
 With success stories such as this, CED becomes an appealing and legitimate 
option for governments. With fewer options at their disposal governments have turned to 
CED and the individuals in the communities to address economic decline. Not only does 
CED have the potential to affect economic growth, it also asks that community members 
become actively engaged in efforts to affect this growth. Progress depends, in part, on 
the effort the community is willing to put into it. It alters the relationship between a 
community and the provincial and federal governments from one of dependency to one 
of self-sufficiency – a relationship attractive to both the community and the 
governments.  
 It is perhaps because of this altered relationship that the Economic Council of 
Canada (ECC) has come to support CED efforts. At one time, the ECC held 
“longstanding reservations regarding policies which discriminate in favor of certain 
                                                 
17 Savoie, 69. 
18 Ibid., 69.  
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regions in order to reduce regional disparities”.19 In 1990, the ECC released a report 
titled “From the Bottom Up: The Community Economic-Development Approach.” The 
report reviewed the viability of CED and whether it was a legitimate policy option for 
government.20 Following this ambitious study the ECC changed its view and “sent the 
clear signal”21 that it was prepared to abandon its reservations about CED. The final 
conclusion was that while there are limitations, “community-based economic 
development can, in the right circumstances, be an effective approach.”22  
 Based on some of the challenges that communities face, the report identifies 
different areas where CED organizations can make a contribution and increasing human 
potential is one of the primary areas on which it comments. It states that “unemployment 
erodes skills and entrepreneurial vigor, provokes migration of younger better-educated 
people, and may lead to a decay in social amenities – all of which make the community 
a less attractive place for business than its resources would otherwise dictate.”23 In such 
a case, “local development action can help to control the waste of human potential and 
the associated, social costs of crime, poor health, and family issues.”24 Activity that 
promotes growth through the development of human resources and infrastructure is 
considered an essential service: 
It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this aspect of 
community development. Smaller communities are often critically short 
of common-use services, such as business consulting and counseling, and 
systems for information transfers. This type of infrastructure is as vital to 
development at the end of the 20th century as railroads were at the end of 
the last century. And like elements of physical infrastructure – water and 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 42. 
20 Economic Council of Canada, “From the Bottom-up: The Community Economic Development 
Approach,” (Ottawa: Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data, 1990). 
21 Savoie, 42. 
22 Economic Council of Canada, 9.  
23 Ibid., 4. 
24 Ibid., 4. 
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sewer systems, wharfs and highways – not only does the human-resource 
and information infrastructure help to sustain current economic activity, it 
also enhances prospects for future development.25  
 
Through information services, CED can mitigate the effects of such things as 
unemployment and out-migration. The ECC states that “information is the most basic 
building block of modern economic development” and that “a locally based 
development organization is capable of selecting efficiently the precise kinds of 
information that the community needs at any given time.”26 The report recognizes that 
basic information about where to acquire capital to fund business start-ups, information 
about how financial institutions work, and advice on how to use funding in the most 
cost-efficient way are often difficult to access in smaller communities. The report 
concludes that community development initiatives “clearly have a role to play in helping 
local business people overcome these obstacles.”27  
 CED is not always a certain endeavor, nor is it a panacea. It is simply a 
mechanism that can be jointly pursued by a community and different stakeholders to 
find solutions to economic decline. Rather than simply maintaining the status quo 
through transfer payments from upper levels of government, CED has proven to increase 
economic sustainability and self-sufficiency. This strategy has the potential to affect 
economic growth and the pursuit of various kinds of CED approaches attests to its 
popularity among elected officials. To ensure CED is pursued appropriately however, 
more research is required.   
 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 14. 
26 Ibid., 14.  
27 Ibid., 4. 
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1.3 Purpose of Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine Regional Economic Development 
Authorities (REDAs), a specific CED initiative of the Saskatchewan New Democratic 
Party (NDP) government. The central objective of this thesis is to examine the economic 
and political factors that led to the creation of REDA’s, the functions which they 
perform and the general strategies they employ in doing so, and the factors that might be 
impeding/enabling their ability to perform their functions effectively.  
Inspired by the Rural Development Corporation (RDC) program created by the 
Progressive Conservatives (PCs) in 1986, REDAs were viewed as a more coordinated 
approach to CED than what had existed in the past. In prior years, the province 
supported over one thousand local community economic development organizations28 
but it was felt that these agencies were “uncoordinated, under funded and lacked a clear 
economic development mission.”29 In 1993, REDAs were created amidst a daunting 
fiscal crisis in Saskatchewan. As a result, the service delivery concept known as 
regionalization was being pursued as way to coordinate services in the province such as 
health care, education and economic development. It would ensure a more effective 
delivery of service which would contribute to cost savings for the government. 
 Facing bankruptcy would also cause the Romanow government to turn to a new 
approach to the economy that emphasized partnerships. It was believed that, “the 
                                                 
28 Neville Fernandes, Saskatchewan’s Regional Economic Development Authorities: A 
Background Document (Community University Institute for Social Research, 2003), 5. 
29 Andrew Conte, “Saskatchewan’s REDA’s: bottom-up economic development,”  
Government Finance Review, August 1996 12 (4), 44. 
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provincial government, acting alone, cannot solve all our problems,”30 and that 
partnerships among all the stakeholders were required to achieve renewal.31 Founded on 
the principles of cooperation, REDAs fit this objective well.  
REDAs were designed as umbrella organizations that would monitor the 
activities of CED organizations in their respective regions, but would also be responsible 
for delivering CED services in the area. To meet these objectives REDAs would be 
comprised of a board of directors who were responsible for the strategic direction of the 
organization and staff members responsible for executing the initiatives. They would 
function under operational guidelines designed by the provincial government. These 
guidelines would define a set of expectations for REDAs including an accountability 
structure that was intended to ensure REDAs were meeting performance standards. The 
guidelines also included expectations about the nature of the activities REDAs would 
pursue. Specifically it was expected that REDAs would engage in wealth creation 
activities that fell into seven of the broadly defined CED services. These services 
include: coordination, organizational development and planning, education and training, 
information, research and development, promotion and marketing, local projects and 
initiative management assistance.   
The REDA initiative has been in place for over a decade, but there are some 
indications that the provincial government is not fully committed to the program. REDA 
officials have revealed that the greatest impediments they face are the lack of funding to 
hire and retain enough staff, and funding to pursue key objectives. There were similar 
observations expressed about the RDC program. For example, in 1992 Edward Addo 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 44. 
31 Ibid., 44. 
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commented that “considering the relatively small financial support and the lack of 
funding for hiring Economic Development Officers (EDOs) working at the local level, 
one has to question the government’s genuine commitment to the programme. A skeptic 
might conclude that this programme is little more than political showmanship, an 
abdication of responsibility, and a political ‘passing of the buck’.”32 While governments 
seemed eager to initiate CED programs there is little evidence that they were committed 
to these programs. This thesis examines REDAs and the implications of the provincial 
government’s involvement in their creation and its commitment to their continuing 
operation. 
 
1.4 Importance of Thesis 
This thesis is important because of the insights it provides for an understanding 
of the implementation and operation of REDAs. CED is a popular response to economic 
development. In order to ensure it is pursued in a manner that is most effective however, 
there needs to be more research conducted. As recently as 2000 Donald J. Savoie wrote 
that, “community economic development, both as a public policy process and a field of 
study, is still in its infancy. Consequently, we are still at the stage of trying various 
measures to see what works and what does not.”33 He added that CED literature has 
lacked “a practical side and left the professionals having trouble not only applying their 
approaches or prescriptions but even understanding them.”34 For practical purposes, 
therefore, this thesis will provide those involved in economic development both inside 
                                                 
32 Edward Addo, A Geographical Analysis of the Rural Development Corporation (RDC) 
Programme in Saskatchewan, (Regina: University of Regina, 1992), 126.  
33 Savoie, 23. 
34 Savoie, 56. 
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and outside Saskatchewan with some potentially valuable comparative insights 
regarding the functions and strategies of REDAs and the factors which affect their 
performance.  
CED theory can also be considerably vague in terms of how these bodies should 
be organized and the role the government should take in their operation. For theory-
building purposes, this thesis will contribute to the CED literature regarding the factors 
that affect the creation, functions, strategies and effectiveness of this particular CED 
organization in Saskatchewan. It will also provide an analysis of the Saskatchewan 
government’s role, contributing to the progress towards defining a proper framework for 
government involvement in CED in the province.   
 
1.5 Overview of Chapters and Information Sources 
In addition to this introductory chapter, the thesis consists of four chapters.  
Generally the information for the various chapters is based on several documentary 
sources, including two government documents that detail the REDA framework, a report 
released by the Community University Institute of Social Research (CUSIR) and written 
by Neville Fernandes, as well as fifteen extensive interviews with current and former 
REDA, provincial, and municipal officials.  
 Chapter 2 provides information about the context in which REDAs were created. 
It details the development of REDAs starting with the creation of Rural Development 
Corporation program under Premier Grant Devine’s Conservative provincial 
government, and then focuses on the creation of the REDAs under Premier Roy 
Romanow’s NDP government. These two economic development initiatives are founded 
on the principles of grassroots economic development that focuses on partnerships and 
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cooperation. Given some of the challenges associated with the small size of RDCs, 
however, REDAs were created to consolidate the multitude of CED organizations that 
existed in Saskatchewan. REDAs have evolved from the CED principle that economic 
development can and should occur by enabling the people within communities to work 
on their own behalf to become economically sustainable. Both the PC and NDP 
governments recognized the value of this principle, but it has been the NDP government 
that took the opportunity to elevate this program and make it a foundation piece of its 
economic plan.  
Chapter 2 is based on a variety of books written on Saskatchewan politics during 
the 1980s and 1990s, focusing on the commentary that surrounded the political issues 
that drove the economic policy of the Devine government in the late 1980s and then the 
Romanow government when it came to power in 1993. It also relies on a thesis written 
by Edward Addo on the RDC program. Given that there is very little published material 
available on RDCs, it provided some important details about the program. Other sources 
that were critical for this chapter include annual reports released by the Department of 
Rural Development, Hansard verbatim reports, and a variety of news articles. 
Chapter 3 is an examination of how REDAs are organized and how they operate 
and includes a discussion on the relationship between REDAs and the government. This 
chapter also provides an overview and analysis of the organizational and accountability 
framework of REDAs. When REDAs were created the Romanow government released 
two documents which are considered phase I and phase II of the initiative. These 
documents highlight some of the major characteristics of REDAs and they provide much 
of the analytical foundation for this chapter. These documents, however, were released 
at the outset of the initiative and do not provide a full and complete picture of the 
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program. The government has not published any further information that details the 
design and operation of REDAs. This chapter therefore deals with the organizational 
details that relate to the human and financial resources available to REDAs and 
documents some of the organizational changes that have occurred since their inception 
in 1993. Some of the topics include the relationship between REDA board members and 
staff, the relationship between REDAs and the government, the funding structure, and 
the accountability framework. 
 This chapter was drawn from a combination of the government’s phase I and 
phase II REDA documents, core funding guidelines from 2004/2005 and 2006/07/08, 
and interviews with REDA and provincial government officials. The published 
documents provided the foundation for the chapter and the interviews provided some of 
the more precise details and some of the impressions and opinions about the way 
REDAs are organized and how they operate. Also used to provide further details about 
the program were REDA websites and an array of news articles published about REDA 
activities.  
Chapter 4 is an examination of the factors that affect REDA performance. It 
includes an analysis of the commitment from the provincial government to see REDA 
function as effectively as possible. It reveals that the success of the REDA program is 
largely dependent upon what the Government of Saskatchewan has been willing to 
invest in it.  In terms of financial contributions there is some evidence suggesting that 
the government was failing to provide REDAs with adequate support. The common 
themes that emerged from interviews with REDA officials was that they were 
experiencing significant difficulties retaining qualified staff and obtaining enough funds 
to fulfill their needs. If REDAs are going to address obstacles like skilled labor 
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shortages, dependencies on agriculture, and retaining youth, they will need to be 
properly equipped to do so. While funding concerns are important and continue to 
impede the efforts of REDAs, the government has made some significant non-monetary 
contributions. This includes the empowerment of REDA officials through substantial 
government services that offer support and training. It also includes and evaluation 
procedure for REDAs that contributes to the overall effectiveness of their organizational 
framework. This chapter relies almost exclusively on interviews with REDA and 
provincial officials as well as information contained in Hansard. 
Chapter 5 provides a summary of the major findings of this thesis and some 
observations regarding what all REDAs and all orders of government involved with 
them should consider in their efforts to maximize economic and community 
development capacity. 
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Chapter 2: 
 
The Creation of REDA’s: Purposes, Processes and Politics 
 
2.1 Introduction  
In 1992 REDAs were introduced as part of Partnership for Renewal: A Strategy 
for the Saskatchewan Economy, the NDP governments plan for the revitalization of the 
Saskatchewan economy. REDAs are an extension of RDC’s, which were CED 
organizations that were introduced by the Progressive Conservatives (PCs) in 1986. 
Both RDCs and REDAs were established because these provincial governments 
believed that local or regional agencies can work together to foster economic 
development in their communities. 
The major difference between the two is really that REDAs would be organized 
on a larger regional scale and the principles of inter-community and inter-agency 
cooperation and coordination would be emphasized to a greater extent than they had 
been with RDCs. There were challenges that RDCs faced because of their small size and 
there was some indication that economic development needed to occur on a larger 
regional scale if it was going to be effective. The size of REDAs helped to meet some of 
these challenges, but it did get some criticism. It was believed that the type of 
regionalization that the government was promoting or imposing in areas like health care 
and education was contributing to the devastation of small urban and rural communities 
throughout Saskatchewan. REDAs were viewed as another potentially problematical 
regionalization initiative. In the end, however, the government successfully implemented 
the program without any sustained criticism.  During the past fifteen years, REDAs have 
been an important pillar of the NDP’s approach to regional economic development in the 
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province which emphasizes the principles of partnerships and a limited role for the 
provincial government.  
 
2.2 Rural Development Corporations in the Devine Era 
Not unlike other political parties in Saskatchewan’s history, the Progressive 
Conservative government under Grant Devine was primarily concerned with bringing 
prosperity to Saskatchewan. Heavily influenced by the rhetoric of neo-liberalism, but 
unwilling to subscribe to it in its entirety, the Devine government initiated a 
development strategy described as “compassionate conservatism.”35 The idea was that 
government could be progressive by continuing to support health, education and social 
programs but also be conservative by providing economic incentives through tax cuts.36 
This was not a cautious government. Following the neo-liberal logic, it cut 
millions from the provincial treasury through tax cuts and government spending in the 
hopes of fostering economic development in the province. The belief was that by 
allowing people to invest more of their own money to better advantage themselves they 
would also be creating jobs and building the province.37 The abolition of the gas tax was 
intended to serve this purpose. In addition, the government had a strong faith in the neo-
liberal assumption that lowering corporate taxes would naturally create an investor 
friendly climate and attract foreign investment thereby growing the economy.  In line 
with this theory, the Devine government made dramatic changes to the oil royalty rates, 
                                                 
35 James Pitsula, “Grant Devine,” in Saskatchewan Premiers of the Twentieth Century Ed. B. 
Gordon L. Barnhart (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, University of Regina, 2004), 322. 
36 Ibid., 322. 
37 Janice MacKinnon, Minding the Public Purse: The Fiscal Crisis, Political Trade-offs, and 
Canada’s Future (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 14. 
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including “a reduction in the royalty rates for existing production, and a three-year 
royalty-free period for production from new wells.”38  
The Devine government would also embark on an economic development 
strategy that called for huge government investment of tax dollars in megaprojects. 
While this kind of intervention was based on the desire to develop business, it ran 
counter to the theory of neo-liberalism which rejected the ability of government to 
“rationally achieve any specific ends.”39 Nevertheless, the Devine government would 
invest heavily under the rationale that governments could use its “largesse to solve 
peoples’ problems.”40 Consequently, it created several programs to attempt to aid the 
business sector. One such undertaking was the Industrial Incentives program which 
provided manufacturers and processors “with incentive payments to help them expand 
existing industrial plants and launch new ones.”41 There were also three mega-projects 
that used over one billion dollars in investments: the New Grade and Husky heavy oil 
upgraders and Crown Life.42 The expectation was that these kinds of big investments in 
the economy would garner big returns.  
The result of such a strategy was that the government was cutting taxes and 
spending without regard to the deficit it was creating. Following its first term, the 
Devine government faced a massive deficit that was growing uncontrollably.43 The 
market failed to deliver the prosperity that was expected and by the time the NDP came 
                                                 
38 Mark Stobbe, “Political Conservatism and Fiscal Irresponsibility,” in Devine Rule in 
Saskatchewan: A Decade of Hope and Hardship Ed B. Lesley Biggs and Mark Stobbe (Saskatoon: Fifth 
House Publishers, 1991), 20. 
39 Stephen Clarkson, Uncle Sam and Us: Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 128. 
40 MacKinnon, 13. 
41 Saskatchewan Economic Development and Trade, Building With Industry: The Industrial 
Incentives Program (Regina: Government of Saskatchewan, 1987), 1. 
42 MacKinnon, 43. 
43  Stobbe, 31. 
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to power under the leadership of Roy Romanow in 1991, “the province’s total public 
debt amounted to $12.704 billion,”44 and it was reported in 1993 that the provinces 
credit rating was at BBB+, “the lowest of any government in Canada.”45 
These kinds of approaches to economic policy characterized the Devine 
government, yet it also managed to create policy around smaller-scale programs aimed 
at fostering CED. One such initiative was the RDC program, intended to deliver 
grassroots economic development in rural communities across Saskatchewan. Unlike 
mega-projects which had government input and involvement,  the RDC program 
consisted of very little government  input or involvement and focused on ‘bottom-up’ 
development which placed control into the hands of the community. When one examines 
the Devine era it is clear that the approach was about taking big chances and spending 
big money to gain big rewards. At first glance, therefore, it is not clear why this 
government would utilize an approach that takes years of dedicated community 
investment to produce incremental payoffs. CED focuses on long-term goals and this 
differs considerably from the immediate rewards the Devine government was expecting 
the market to produce.  
The adoption of this small-scale approach to economic development can be 
understood by looking at explanations that take into account a mix of technical and 
political rationality. The dominance of agricultural in Saskatchewan caused the creation 
of hundreds of rural municipalities and this led to parallel development of infrastructure 
for each and every small community. As the agriculture industry waned, however, the 
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population of rural Saskatchewan began to diminish. Past governments, in an attempt to 
preserve rural Saskatchewan, had not only maintained that infrastructure but also 
expanded it. One commentator writes that: “The family farm was the social and 
economic foundation of the province. So we produced and nurtured an infrastructure to 
support the agricultural society that gave Saskatchewan its meaning and raison d’etre.”46  
Preserving rural communities has been an objective of many Saskatchewan 
governments, but perhaps none more so than the Devine government. Janice 
MacKinnon, a former finance minister under Romanow, writes that, “if there was one 
overriding dream that united the Conservative caucus, it was saving rural Saskatchewan 
and preserving the family farm and the values of hard work and community spirit that it 
represented.”47 This commitment is evident through the considerable amount of 
resources that were directed toward rural areas in an attempt to revitalize the rural 
economy. In the 1980s the government introduced a series of programs aimed at 
preserving the agriculture industry and the rural way of life, pumping millions into these 
communities.48 It made rural Saskatchewan a priority and in doing so maintained or 
increased investments in rural infrastructure.  For example, in an attempt to make rural 
Saskatchewan an attractive place to live, “ten new hospitals were built, there was special 
financial support for community facilities such as curling rinks, and more than $500 
million was spent bringing natural gas and individual telephone lines to rural 
households.”49 
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48 Ibid., 21. 
49 Ibid., 22-23. 
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It was this concern for rural communities that motivated the PC government to 
establish The Task Force on Rural Development (TFRD) in 1984. The TFRD conducted 
research and consultations with individuals and organizations in order to “seek their 
views on the issues and opportunities in rural Saskatchewan and to obtain their ideas on 
measures to stimulate rural development.”50 Its final report, titled Strategy for the 
Development of Rural Saskatchewan, and released in 1985, was the “product of about 
ten months of Task Force deliberations, and contains observations and recommendations 
of consideration by the Minister of Rural Development, the Government, and the people 
of Saskatchewan.”51  
The report covered a multitude of issues facing rural Saskatchewan and offered 
92 recommendations for consideration by the government. In Chapter V, “Organization 
of Local Economic Development,” concern was expressed over the lack of “effective 
mechanisms to both initiate and respond to rural development opportunities at the sub-
provincial level.”52 In particular there was concern that “there is no identified individual 
or group with the mandate to search out development opportunities and to relate them to 
the information and assistance available to senior governments and the private sector.”53 
This concern arose from consultations with individuals in government 
departments and Crown Corporations who stated that, among other things, there was a 
need for “a corporate body structure … for several communities to work together to plan 
the economic and social strategy of the total area” and a “community based program 
which encourages communities to merge into larger regional structures by offering some 
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incentive for doing so.”54 In addition, an investigation into other jurisdictions showed 
that similar bodies existed throughout Canada and the United States. These revelations 
led the TFRD to conclude that there was a “significant gap in the organization for 
economic development at the sub-provincial level,”55 and recommend different 
programs aimed at filling this gap. Included in these recommendations was the 
framework for Area Development Corporations (ADCs) which would be regional 
corporations with a board of directors from the member organizations and a full-time 
general manager to run operations. In August of 1986, less than a year after the 
publication of the Strategy for the Development of Rural Saskatchewan, the Government 
of Saskatchewan created the Rural Development Corporation program, modeled after 
the ADC program recommended by the TFRD.   
Given the PC government’s desire to aid in the preservation and development of 
rural Saskatchewan it is not surprising that it implemented the RDC program. The TFRD 
identified a gap in the delivery of rural economic development. It identified a new 
approach that had some potential to make a difference and given that the new focus of 
the economy was on privately owned business, whether it came from within the 
province or without, the RDCs were an attractive program to the Devine government. 
The expectation was that they would serve to foster development of private business as 
well as rural communities by giving local people the means necessary to develop locally 
owned business. In a way therefore, the ‘top-down’ government strategy of mega-
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projects and tax incentives would complement the incremental ‘bottom-up’ strategy of 
CED while concurrently addressing the challenges of rural Saskatchewan.56 
On the other hand, it seems that a case could be made that this program, and 
many others aimed at rural Saskatchewan, were driven by political motivations. 
Electoral support for the Devine government was largely concentrated in rural areas. 
Adding new programs made rural residents feel more secure which in turn served to add 
to the Devine government’s chances of electoral success.  In addition, concern had been 
expressed over whether or not the government implemented the program because it 
made “planning more sensitive to local people.”57 As it was discussed in Chapter 1, 
Edward Addo expressed skepticism over the government’s commitment to the program 
suggesting that given the limited funding, it may have been an attempt to simply offload 
responsibilities.58  This may also suggest that the Devine government was more 
concerned with the political payoff for the governing party than with the economic 
payoff the RDCs could create for the communities.  
 
2.3 The Rationale for the Transition from RDCs to REDAs 
REDAs were created amidst a daunting fiscal crisis in Saskatchewan which 
placed considerable constraints on the Romanow government following the 1991 
provincial election. The debt became a major priority and naturally there was pressure to 
find new ways of cutting costs. One method that gained credibility at the time was 
regionalization. This approach was in response to the duplication of services across 
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Saskatchewan which was creating a considerable degree of inefficiency and waste. In 
better times, it was possible for governments to ignore, or at least not address, the 
proliferation of an underused infrastructure in rural Saskatchewan. On the verge of 
bankruptcy, however, the option of maintaining the status quo was no longer feasible or 
acceptable for the Romanow government. 
The rationale for regionalization in the economic development sector, as in other 
sectors, was to maximize efficiencies and effectiveness in service provision and in 
community development by raising the focus from the local to the regional level. 
Perhaps one of the more well-known cases of regionalization was the health care 
reforms initiated in 1991.59 Regionalization or “integration is a service delivery concept 
whereby the governance, planning, decision making and delivery of several types of 
public services are brought together under the same governance, administrative and 
delivery structure.”60 Duane Adams describes the problem that was occurring with 
health care in Saskatchewan due to the highly fragmented nature of a locally based, 
rather than regionally based, system: 
There were more than 400 separate, independent boards running fragments 
of the Saskatchewan health system. There was little co-ordination among 
them, but many jealousies and a lot of unhelpful competition. Each health 
institution and program was protecting itself, its own money and personnel, 
and its own community economic interests. No one was looking out for the 
interests of the whole person, family or community. And, from the point of 
view of the 400 institutions, there was no incentive or reward for taking a 
more integrative, co-operative, holistic approach to their business.61 
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Interestingly, the situation with health care was analogous to many other sectors across 
Saskatchewan, particularly with the economic development sector which had numerous 
CED organizations prior the creation of the REDAs, the education sector prior to the 
creation of larger regional school boards, and the municipal sector in which there are 
still more than 800 municipalities in a province with approximately one million people.   
REDAs were created as a way to regionalize CED initiatives in the province. 
Around the time REDAs were implemented there were over 750 organizations 
committed to some kind of CED activity, including Community Economic Development 
Committees, Rural Development Corporations, Community Tourism Committees, 
Community Bond Corporations, and Community Futures Committees.62  While CED 
activities had increased, this process had “not created organizations large enough to deal 
effectively with community and economic development, and it ha[d] not developed 
viable and sustainable organizations through cooperation and collaboration.”63 The 
proliferation of organizations created duplication and overlap in mandate, a lack of 
coordination and a narrow base of involvement. It further created an unsustainable 
financial situation because “each municipality financially supports between three and 
seven CED organizations.”64 It was reasoned, therefore, that there was a need for 
“comprehensive regional and community level planning, cooperation and support.”65  
REDAs would become the umbrella organization under which all other CED 
organizations would operate. They would work to “offer communities an opportunity to 
increase cooperation, partnerships and sharing, and to make more effective use of their 
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limited financial and human resources.”66 REDAs would both manage some of the CED 
services in the region as well as deliver them. As a mandatory service, they would be 
expected to provide coordination and consolidation by working with, and being 
knowledgeable of, the different services in the region so as to avoid the narrow, 
competitive and duplicated mandates that had been occurring. Beyond this, REDAs 
would deliver six other CED services: organizational development and planning; 
education and training; information services; research and development services; local 
project and initiative management assistance and promotion and marketing services (See 
Appendix A).  
As noted above, the provincial government considered RDCs as one of these 
many different CED organizations that needed to be coordinated. The NDP government 
presented them as another set of under-funded and under-coordinated economic 
development organizations. Subsequent sections of this chapter will reveal that there 
were problems with RDCs which led the provincial government to conclude that a larger 
regional body would be more effective.  
This rationale denies the influence the RDC model had on the creation of 
REDAs. In many respects REDAs emulated the principles of the RDCs. This significant 
detail was left out of the partnership promotional material, which denied the influence 
that the RDCs had on the conceptual development of the REDA program. Instead, RDCs 
were categorized as simply one of hundreds of Community Economic Development 
organizations initiated in the 1980s.67 The government did briefly point to the relevance 
of RDCs in the first document published on REDAs which states that “RDCs are logical 
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building blocks upon which to establish REDAs.”68 However, very little is said about 
this matter in subsequent documents.  The brief mention afforded RDCs in that 
document is likely why no subsequent report, document or news article published in the 
years since REDAs were created mention that REDAs were essentially founded on the 
RDC concept.  
RDCs were not simply one of many other economic development agents 
throughout the province. They held more significance than that. RDCs were regional 
development organizations, albeit generally operating on a much smaller regional scale 
than REDAs. They were comprised of a board of directors and one or two staff members 
mandated to facilitate the growth of business in their area. Like the REDAs, the RDCs 
were based on the principle of community cooperation to achieve economic 
development goals. They were also engaged in largely the same activities undertaken by 
REDAs. They undertook feasibility studies, research, training for RMs and various 
initiatives in areas such as tourism and the hog industry.69  
There are several explanations that reveal why RDCs were not considered 
sufficient and why there was a move to the larger regional model of REDAs. As a 
minimum requirement the RDCs were expected to have four municipalities, one of 
which had to be a rural municipality. While some RDCs included as many as 14 
municipalities, they were, on average, comprised of six or seven and, as of 1990, only 
one contained a city.70 RDCs had a limited number of municipalities and this made it 
difficult to adopt a larger regional perspective both for planning and development. 
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Instead, the individual corporations were looking to serve the interest of the few 
communities in their respective geographic areas, forgetting that cooperation was an 
essential part of facilitating a much broader ‘bottom-up’ economic development 
approach for an entire region consisting of many more communities.  
Like the health care sector, there was little co-ordination, many jealousies, and a 
lot of unhelpful competition. The program was intended to foster economic development 
in the individual communities, but the competition for investors was undercutting 
efforts. For example, if a corporation was interested in setting up a feedlot in a rural 
Saskatchewan community, the neighboring RDCs would discourage that corporation 
from investing in the rival communities. The result was a lose-lose situation because 
each RDC was highlighting the reasons not to invest, causing all communities to lose 
out.71  
RDCs were also contributing to a larger problem that went beyond coordination 
and cooperation, one that was affecting many rural communities. The duplication of 
services in every small town meant that all of the boards and associations were being run 
by the same people a real problem of fatigue set in. Small communities in Saskatchewan 
typically only have a handful of individuals willing to serve on a board or an 
association.72 Consequently, responsibility for the various health, education or economic 
development boards was being put on the shoulders of a few people causing less than 
effective service and ultimately burnout of those few people.  
The rationale for greater regionalization at the time was also heavily influenced 
by the work done by Jack Stabler and Rose Olfert. The study identified the services 
                                                 
71 Ibid., 68. 
72 Confidential Interview.  
 28 
available in each Saskatchewan community and documented some of the trends 
associated with urbanization. Their conclusions are based on central place theory, which 
emphasizes the role of a central place (town/municipality) which acts “as a service and 
distribution centre for its hinterland, providing its own, and the adjacent population, with 
goods and services.”73 They classified Saskatchewan communities into different tiers 
and conclude that it is the fifty-two second tier, or complete and partial shopping 
centres, that played at least a self-sustaining role in the province. They wrote that in 
contemporary times “it is these centres that can be most affected by private and public 
investment decisions,” because “if both the consolidation and the new construction are 
undertaken with a view to strengthening [these centres] they can continue to perform the 
very important functions they now provide to the rest of Saskatchewan.”74 
The thrust of their argument was that not all Saskatchewan communities can be 
preserved. The reality is that the majority of the 419 communities classified on the 
bottom tier, or the minimum convenience centres, “have no systematic role in today’s 
trade-centre system,”75 and that “only through an unlikely fortuitous event will any of 
these communities regain a functional position in the trade-centre system.”76 They 
argued that the retention of infrastructure like schools and hospitals in “communities that 
are no longer viable will neither enhance their prospects for rejuvenation nor prevent 
further decline.”77 They suggested that if governments were going to invest in these 
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economies, then targeting their investments to locations that have the potential to grow 
would be the best approach. Failure to do so could mean the fifty-two complete and 
partial shopping centres vital to Saskatchewan’s economy may no longer be viable if 
trends continue. They added that focused investment, however, means that governments 
“will have to avoid the narrow political interests which have all too frequently been the 
basis for allocating public investment in the past.” Instead, the guiding criterion for 
investment, they argued,  must be based, “upon recognition of the contribution that 
regional concentration of public infrastructure can have on maintaining the viability of 
the system of rural trade centres…”78 Instead of focusing on  isolated communities, 
economic development had to be centered around larger trading units. Given the 
challenges RDCs faced and the implications of the analysis provided by Stabler and 
Olfert it was felt that these bodies would be more effective if they represented and 
served larger regions.  
It was expected that REDAs would work together with the member 
municipalities as well as various stakeholders in the region. Unlike RDCs, REDAs were 
to forge partnerships with municipalities, businesses, cooperatives, other CED 
organizations and community groups to determine economic development goals. It was 
hoped that this kind of cooperation would allow REDAs to look out for the interests of 
the entire region and not just the interests of only a few municipalities. Competition, if 
not eliminated, could be at least identified and managed. It was believed that by having 
one organization engaged in planning and development for an entire region it would be 
less likely that efforts could be undermined by action or inaction of another community.  
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Furthermore, cooperation of this kind would allow REDAs to be more knowledgeable of 
the services being delivered in the area by various other economic development groups. 
If small business loans, for example, were being delivered effectively by another body, 
then the REDA could ensure efforts were not wasted by setting up and administering 
another loan program. REDAs would also be able to direct individuals to an 
organization that would best be able to serve their needs. REDAs would not be working 
in isolation of other organizations and instead would be able to ensure that all services 
were being utilized as fully as possible. All of this would lead to greater efficiency and 
effectiveness for community economic development purposes.  
 
2.4 Politics of the Transition 
The major concern expressed over the transition from RDCs to REDAs was over 
the loss of autonomy in the smaller rural communities and what was considered by some 
to be the unmanageable larger areas. In the one legislative debate on the subject, the 
transition from RDCs to REDAs was placed in the context of the greater regionalization 
that was occurring with such things as health care and education at the time. The 
concern was that the government was essentially abandoning rural Saskatchewan 
because consolidating services on a regional scale often meant pulling out of smaller 
urban and rural communities. It was suggested that shutting down SaskPower offices, 
closing down hospitals and gravelling highways devastated many such communities and 
that the move to REDAs was another example of the “bigger is somehow better”79 
philosophy that seemed to be guiding the NDP government of the time.  
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It was also suggested that as a result of such strategies each community would 
lose the individual attention provided to them by the RDCs. Having one REDA 
represent an area that once had several RDCs would mean that individual communities 
were no longer receiving the same level of attention. They would lose their autonomy 
and become simply one of many communities within the region. The effort that was 
focused on an individual community by the RDC would now be placed on the region. 
The consensus was that this would mean that some communities might no longer be 
considered as a location for a new business, hospitals or other services.80  
It was also noted that some community members were quite satisfied with the 
size of the RDCs that represented their area. They felt that the “geographic size of the 
RDC was still a size they could all work together for a common goal” and that REDAs 
were so large and encompassed so many trading areas that they were virtually 
unmanageable.81 This sentiment was similar to the one expressed by a former RDC 
manager who stated that some REDAs are so large they represent areas that have 
markets driven by different industry and so they have very little on which they can work 
together.  
Despite such concerns there was little or no major organized opposition to the 
implementation of REDAs and this is likely due to a combination of factors.  The first 
was the government’s decision to make it a priority to engage with those at the local 
level to negotiate the new boundaries. The government recognized that REDAs had to 
be implemented on a voluntary basis. It was not the size that was as important as was 
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“the cohesiveness of the partnership”82 and so the government might provide 
information and suggestions on what would be an appropriate size, but ultimately it was 
up to the community members to decide on the boundaries. It was expected that 
“through trust building, cooperation and collaboration, communities and other partners 
should be able to bring their needs, expectations and concerns to the table and reach 
consensus about how to address mutual problems.”83  
As well, REDAs were created in partnership with RDCs. It was suggested that an 
appropriate size for a REDA would take into consideration “their population base, the 
existing economic base, dominant trading areas, geographical features, local history, 
infrastructure and existing units of cooperation such as Rural Development 
Corporations.”84 It happened that some RDCs were large enough and were working 
effectively enough that they were able to maintain a similar size when they were 
transitioned into REDAs. The Mainline REDA for example would operate as an RDC 
and the boundaries stayed exactly the same when the transition was made.85 In other 
cases, RDCs were maintained and simply operated under the umbrella of the REDA. 
The communities in the Bear Hills RDC, for example, would only work together if the 
community could retain its autonomy by keeping the RDC that had already been 
established. The RDC would have to find its own resources to operate and to employ an 
economic development officer, but it would now work in cooperation with the REDA.86 
RDCs were not forced to work with communities with which they had nothing in 
common and they were not forced to relinquish their autonomy. In short, decisions were 
                                                 
82 Ibid., 1503.  
83 Fernandes, 11. 
84 Ibid., 18. 
85 Confidential Interview.  
86 Confidential Interview. 
 33 
to be made by the communities and it was likely this kind of empowerment at the 
community level that helped to suppress any fears or concerns.  
Given the limited number of legislative debates on the transition, it also seems 
that opposition members either supported the transition or they were occupied with other 
concerns. It was suggested that there really was a need for the regionalization of services 
and the opposition preferred that the NDP take on this responsibility.87 It very well could 
have been the case that the opposition parties supported the initiative. In addition, after 
1991 there were not many opposition members left in the Legislature and if they were 
going to express opposition to regionalization, it was more likely to be directed toward 
health care reform that was being undertaken at that time and not a smaller initiative like 
REDAs.88 It seems that health care regionalization that was occurring at the time 
overshadowed any debates about RDCs and REDAs. Opposition members were more 
likely to cite the loss of jobs from the closing of a hospital rather than the job loss 
occurring form one person employed at an RDC.  
 
2.5 The Partnership for Renewal and the Formation of REDAs 
REDAs were first introduced in The Partnership for Renewal policy paper. The 
government was moving toward an economic strategy that called for less government 
involvement; they wanted to be facilitators of growth, rather than main drivers. The 
REDAs fit this objective well. Since their inception REDAs have gained more 
prominence than what RDCs had been able to obtain. This had been partly due to the 
                                                 
87 Confidential Interview.  
88 Confidential Interview.  
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government’s shift in priorities, but also due to the increased capacity REDAs enjoyed 
as larger regional units.  
The Partnership for Renewal began as a multi-staged initiative where the 
government looked to the civil service and to the public to find out what needed to be 
reformed. The first step in this process was for all line departments and agencies to put 
together a briefing package for new ministers in the new government. They offered 
advice and assessed what was good and what was bad. Second, there was a cabinet level 
meeting that mandated that planning tables were to be set up where senior caucus 
official members would spend half a day with a select group of officials and others to 
talk about the problem of economic development and the fiscal crisis.89 
There followed the more public element of the process, a conference of 25 of the 
leading actors in the business and trade union community. The meeting was a closed-
door affair where individuals were given the opportunity to frankly lay out the 
circumstances of Saskatchewan, discuss all of the options and then try to agree on at 
least notions of policy that might be developed. It was in this “very concentrated 
session”90 that the vision statement for the “Partnership” was created. Finally, the 
process culminated in a series of discussions between the Minister of Economic 
Development, staff from his department and representatives from over 200 groups and 
sectors of interest.91 
The primary objective of the “Partnership” was to adopt the appropriate 
mechanisms to foster economic development. In the Message from the Minister”, Dwain 
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91 Government of Saskatchewan, Partnership For Renewal: A Strategy for the Saskatchewan 
Economy (Regina: Government of Saskatchewan, 1992), 7. 
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Lingenfelter wrote that “the challenge before us is to create the wealth we need to 
support ourselves, our families and the services we value.”92 In order to accomplish this 
objective, the document indicated “that the provincial government, acting alone, cannot 
solve all our problems. Partnerships among all the stakeholders are required to achieve 
the renewal we desire.”93 It is this theme in particular that is indicative of the overall 
approach government would be taking.  
The “Partnership” began as a concept introduced by Frank Hart, the newly 
appointed Deputy Minister of Economic Development. His idea was to strategically 
place the government’s image on the economy. This was an image of a government 
taking a much more limited, hands-off approach to the economy where the people of 
Saskatchewan and the different sectors would form partnerships to foster economic 
growth. To facilitate this, the government would offer the appropriate support, but it 
would not take the lead. In 1993 Lingenfelter indicated that the government’s role in the 
economy would be more about the co-ordination of resources and stakeholders rather 
than direct intervention through megaprojects or tax incentives. He stated that: “There 
are some things government can do best and other things that are best done by business, 
individuals or local communities. In this strategy, we will facilitate, we will encourage, 
we will provide an enabling framework, but we will not try to run the whole show.”94 
For the NDP government, which was emphasizing the need for community based 
partnerships and the need for government to take a more laissez-faire approach to 
economic development, REDAs were logical development instruments rooted in 
                                                 
92 Partnership, 1.  
93 Ibid., 1. 
94 Anonymous, “A new economic development strategy for Saskatchewan,” Economic 
Development Review Vol 11 Iss.1 (Winter 1993), 68. 
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Saskatchewan’s legacy of community cooperation. Through REDAs, communities and 
stakeholders would work together to “enhance the economic life of the region and its 
residents … building on the strengths, resources and talents of partnership and 
communities.”95 The government’s role in this would be to act as a facilitator by creating 
the incentive for “local people with the knowledge of local resources and local 
opportunities [to get] themselves motivated for their own self-interest.”96 REDAs would 
not be another top-down, government controlled approach to economic development. 
The government provided the framework and some support and resources, but the 
communities would supply the leadership and knowledge of the region to plan for 
economic growth.  
There is no consensus on the value of REDAs. For example, in 2004, the City of 
Moose Jaw decided to refuse additional funding to the MJ REDA. Councilor’s 
questioned what REDAs offered and suggested that there was a need for money to be 
put into “specific economic projects rather than into studies and reports.”97 Such 
councilors, and others like them, did not have faith that all REDA activities were 
necessarily producing results. Despite this, however, news reports covering the negative 
perceptions of REDAs and their initiatives seem to be the exception rather than the rule. 
More often, news coverage tends to be either neutral or positive. In response to Moose 
Jaw’s refusal to contribute further funding to the MJ REDA, a letter to the editor noted 
that,  
any new business or manufacturing concern which has 
located here in the past few years has, at one point, 
                                                 
95 Ibid., 68. 
96 Conte, 44. 
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Times 11 March 2004, 4.  
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gleaned information that REDA has provided … The 
Community Profile document provided by REDA is one 
of the finest documents that a perspective investor, 
developer or builder can have at their disposal. This 
document also has value for those looking to relocate in 
Moose Jaw, as it provides valuable information regarding 
our city and surrounding area.98  
 
The implication of this letter was that it is usually a lack of information about what 
REDAs offer that leads to the conclusion that they are of limited value.   
An indicator of REDA popularity however, is the support the concept of 
community development has received from persons and political parties across the 
political spectrum. RDCs were created by a Progressive Conservative government in the 
1980s. At that time an opposition NDP member stated: “I would like to say that the 
concept of rural development corporations is one of the most progressive things I’ve 
ever seen your government do since 1982.”99 In the 1990s, the NDP took the concept 
and implemented it on a larger scale and with greater emphasis on cooperation and 
coordination. Today the REDA approach is also respected by the Official Opposition, 
the Saskatchewan Party, which wants to take the concept and move it to a provincial 
scale. In 2004, the SaskParty released The Promise of Saskatchewan: A New Vision for 
Saskatchewan’s Economy. In this report Brad Wall, the SaskParty Leader, suggested that 
there is a need to implement Enterprise Saskatchewan, an economic development body 
that takes the REDA model “and elevates it to a provincial platform.”100  Clearly, 
REDAs are considered valuable institutions and, regardless of which of the major parties 
forms the next government, their continuance in the near future seems to be assured. 
                                                 
98 Ibid., 3. 
99 Saskatchewan Legislative Assembly, Committee of Finance, Minutes and Verbatim 
Transcripts, April 20, 1998. 
100 Dwight Percy, “Selling Saskatoon a Systematic Process,” Star Phoenix (August 13, 2005), D1. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
REDAs were implemented to regionalize the delivery of economic development 
in Saskatchewan. They were based on similar principles of the RDC corporations and 
were intended to replace them. While there was some indication that there were uneasy 
feelings about this transition, the change garnered little public reaction. There are no 
news reports and only one discussion in the Legislative Assembly that acknowledged the 
transition. Part of the reason for this is that any significant opposition was likely 
overshadowed by the ambitious and highly controversial regionalization initiative in the 
health sector.  Interviews with past RDC officials suggest a positive attitude toward the 
change. It seems that any opposition that may have existed when the change was first 
announced has been resolved and long since forgotten. Even past officials identified as 
being opposed to the change, now support the REDA program and the work that they are 
doing.  
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Chapter 3: 
The Organizational, Functional, Financial and Accountability  
Frameworks of REDAs 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 The objective in this chapter is to provide an overview and analysis of the 
organizational, functional, financial, and accountability frameworks of REDAs. 
Accordingly, it consists of four major sections devoted to each of these aspects. The 
section on the organizational framework provides an overview of how they are created, 
their composition, as well as the roles and responsibilities of their boards and staff 
members. The section on the functional framework provides an overview of the major 
roles and responsibilities of REDAs. The section on the financial framework focuses on 
the major sources of the financial resources available to REDAs.  The section on the 
accountability framework focuses on the nature and scope of the accountability of 
REDAs both to its member organizations and to the provincial government. This chapter 
also examines the roles and responsibilities of the provincial government in establishing, 
supporting and monitoring REDAs. It will also devote some attention to alternative 
funding sources, given that in many cases, these sources provide more funding than the 
provincial government.  
 
3.2 Composition of the REDA Board of Directors and Staff 
The roles and responsibilities of board and staff members vary considerably 
among the various REDAs, and in some cases even within the same REDAs over time. 
In some cases a REDA will begin with a very proactive board, one that dedicates a lot of 
time and energy actively seeking out and implementing new projects. Over time, 
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however, as REDAs staff cultivate expertise, the boards are able to take on a less 
extensive role; one that is more concerned with collaborating on strategic direction 
rather than on devising new approaches to economic development. Ideally, it is the GM 
or the EDO who are directing the goal setting because, “in the most successful 
community development corporations, employees are more like associates in a common 
purpose than a source of labour purchased by capital.”101 Of course, REDAs are flexible 
institutions and this skill often comes with experience. Ultimately it is through the 
collaboration and input of both the board and the staff that the strategic direction for the 
REDA can be identified and goals can be pursued.  
Generally, the Board is responsible for setting the goals and priorities for the 
REDA and the staff is responsible for administering and implementing these goals. 
Within this broad framework, however, there are considerable variations in what each 
actually does. A large part of what REDAs do is goal setting which has been described 
as “the manifestation of creative imagination and independent will. It’s the practicality 
of … translating vision in to achievable actionable doing.”102 In the case of REDAs, it is 
about identifying the unique challenges the region faces and the manner in which to 
address these challenges. Although the board is intended to only set policy direction, 
leaving the purely administrative and implementation tasks to the REDA staff, it 
sometimes begins to take on the role of micro-manager or administrator.  Individuals on 
the board not only set policy, but sometimes also engage themselves in the execution of 
the CED services.   In other cases the GM and the EDO are the individuals that take on 
                                                 
101 Leslie Brown, “Organizations for the 21st Century? Co-operatives and ‘new’ forms of 
organization,” Canadian Journal of Sociology  V22  Iss1 (Winter 1997), 65. 
102 Stephan R. Covey, “Business” Encarta.  
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orp (Retrieved December 13 2006). 
 41 
the proactive policy leadership role, identifying new development opportunities to 
pursue; a role that extends far beyond administration. Here, the board takes on a 
relatively minor policy role, contributing what has been described as a “minimal but 
crucial amount of hours”103 to actual policy setting.  
REDAs consist of a board of directors comprised of various stakeholders. In 
most cases there is a central REDA office where staff works out of and often other CED 
organizations such as the federally funded Community Futures or the government’s 
regional office will co-locate with the REDA. Of course there are exceptions to this 
standard approach. The Northeast REDA for example is, “unique in that it does not have 
a fully staffed central office…This organization has service agreement with eight 
local economic development departments (3 full-time & 5 part-time) to pursue 
development in the region.”104 In this case, the Board of Directors is comprised of 
several different economic development officers (EDOs) that work out of each of their 
respective communities. Further exceptions are the REDAs that do not have a central 
office and are comprised of only a Board of Directors that contracts out its 
administrative services.105 
A REDAs staff is usually made up of a general manager (GM), and an economic 
development officer (EDO), or an office administrator. Most REDAs will have between 
one to six staff members. The Regina REDA (RREDA), because of its size, has more 
specialized positions such as an executive assistant, a director of strategic investment, a 
                                                 
103 Confidential Interview. 
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105 Confidential Interview. 
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communications manager, and two research officers.106  Other positions may also be 
created depending on the particular demands associated with the region and how 
necessary that position is determined to be. The Yellowhead REDA, for example, 
employs an agribusiness project manager (APM) who deals with the agriculture 
accounts in the region.107  
Notwithstanding the fact that the creation of REDAs depends on the willingness 
of various types of stakeholders in regional communities to reach a consensus on this 
matter, the provincial government performs important roles not only in their creation, 
but also in the functions which they perform and the financial resources which they use 
in performing those functions. The relationship the provincial government has with 
REDAs (and consequently the Department responsible for REDAs), is often described 
as a partnership. However, the provincial government is a special partner with special 
powers. The provincial government has determined that it will be a partner with key 
roles and responsibilities in the “co-management of economic development services.”108 
In order to perform this role the government provides financial assistance, organizational 
development support, technical expertise, leadership, and advice needed for REDAs to 
“become stable, self-sustaining, and capable of providing essential services in their 
regions.”109  As discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter, the provincial 
government also performs an important oversight and control functions vis-à-vis 
REDAs.  
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3.3 Functional Framework of REDAs 
The functions of REDAs are determined by two major factors, provincial 
government policy and the preferences and capacities of each REDA. As described 
above, the provincial policy framework authorizes REDAs to engage in activities that 
are broadly defined as the seven CED functions. The specific efforts of each category 
will be explained in this section. It is important to keep in mind that some of the 
methods used by REDAs serve more than one purpose. Creating a website for example, 
can both market the region and provide information dissemination on the different 
features of the program.  
The provincial policy states that REDAs engage in functions defined within these 
seven categories. The following examples illustrate that there is a considerable range in 
the nature of the activities each REDA will pursue. Many REDAs will learn from one 
another and will adopt strategies that proved effective. In several ways, therefore, 
REDAs share common characteristics.  It should be noted, however, that the functions of 
each REDA depend largely on its preferences and capacities. Particularly important in 
this respect is the composition of the REDA board and staff. Their education and 
experience and dedication to the process can affect what a REDA accomplishes. 
Furthermore, the functions and activities REDAs pursue are dependent upon the region’s 
geography and the relationships that already exist. Mending relationships between 
neighboring communities and balancing the priorities of each, all influence how REDAs 
are organized and what they decide to pursue.  
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Coordination:  
Coordination is the only mandatory function REDAs are expected to perform by 
the provincial government.110 This means that REDAs need to be knowledgeable about 
the CED services being delivered in the region in order to avoid duplication and overlap 
of these services.  This function allows REDAs to be better equipped to assist clients in 
“accessing available resources and assistance.”111 The emphasis on coordination stems 
from the problems encountered during the RDC days. The lack of communication 
between CED bodies led to the waste of resources. An example offered by a REDA 
official was that while the government expected that Small Business Loans Associations 
(SBLA) would be operated by REDAs, doing so was not always the optimal way for all 
REDAs to be focusing their efforts.112 In many regions there was already a Community 
Futures organization or some other economic development body issuing these loans and 
it was therefore viewed by many REDAs as simply duplicating a service that was 
already being effectively delivered by other agencies. Investing a lot of effort in 
managing another SBLA therefore, was taking away from time that could be spent on 
different CED endeavors.113   
Knowledge of the existing services also allows REDAs to assist clients to access 
available resources and assistance. There is no sense in having various programs 
intended to aid in the development process if these programs are not going to be utilized. 
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Knowing what is available allows REDAs to direct clients to the appropriate sources, 
enabling the most efficient use of resources possible.  
One of the primary ways REDAs provide these two aspects of coordination is 
through the establishment process.  Establishment requires that all CED organizations 
and stakeholders in the region meet to collaborate on the different CED services being 
delivered. This type of collaboration allows stakeholders to harmonize the delivery of 
CED by reaching a consensus about what services may no longer be needed or what 
services could be better delivered by another organization.114 This process relies on the 
cooperation of the communities and it is expected that the decisions made are in the best 
interest of all involved. In the case where a CED organization is comprised of a 
volunteer committee and where it offers services already delivered by another 
organization, it may well be eliminated. Knowing what each organization offers allows 
REDA staff to inform clients.  
To facilitate further coordination, a common mechanism used by many REDAs 
is to have their central office located within the same building as other economic 
development organizations. In Moose Jaw for example, four economic development 
agencies operate a single service delivery location called the District Business Enterprise 
Centre for Entrepreneurs.115 Within this office is the Moose Jaw Chamber of Commerce, 
the South Central Community Futures Corporation, the Moose Jaw REDA and the 
Saskatchewan Industry and Resources regional office. Co-locating these offices allows 
for better collaboration between the different organizations and further convenience for 
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clients. Rather than being directed across town to inquire about a service, they can 
simply go down the hall.  
Otherwise, coordination is largely an informal process and REDAs use different 
approaches. One of the more common is networking with local businesses and other 
economic development organizations through conferences, workshops, regional 
meetings and provincial meetings.116  Another approach is to read local and provincial 
newspapers daily, as well as books and magazines and to research relevant internet sites 
to find information related to what is currently being worked on.117 
Organizational Development and Planning: 
Organizational development and planning often involve strategies that help to aid 
in the retention and expansion of businesses in a particular region. An example is the 
Moose Jaw REDA where, in 2004, a lot of work was done in the manufacturing sector to 
identify issues and opportunities. The MJREDA held a manufacturing showcase where 
the local manufacturers could present the quality of their work in order to foster 
partnering between companies. The result was three or four business alliances and a new 
deal struck between Doepker Industries of Moose Jaw and CTK Plastics.118  
A similar example is the Manufacturers Capacity Exchange website initiated by 
the Carlton Trail REDA in 2005. The website “is a place for manufacturers to register 
their plant capabilities and manufacturing needs.” It allows “the province’s small-to 
medium-sized manufacturers [to] become more profitable by tapping each other’s 
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productive capabilities” helping “Saskatchewan companies do business with each 
other.”119  
Education and Training:  
In order to continue to aid stakeholders and clients, some REDA staff members 
have pursued further education in economic development. One of the primary ways is 
through the Saskatchewan Economic Developers Association (SEDA) which “has 
developed an introductory course for new economic development practitioners and 
volunteers on economic development boards and committees. This course is accredited 
by the Economic Developers Association of Canada (EDAC) which means the course 
credits will be recognized not only across Canada, but in the United States and 
Europe.”120 There are four modules in the course and they help to build the skills of 
economic developers so they are better equipped to identify and address problems with 
economic development in their area.  Another way REDA staff has sought to develop 
their skills is by pursuing economic development certificates and degrees through online 
courses.121 Many REDAs also engage in educational and training activities that help to 
build capacity within the community. A common approach is through youth strategies 
that focus on encouraging entrepreneurship through education. This is the goal of the 
Youth Business Excellence Symposium offered by the Prince Albert REDA. This event 
exposes “youth to entrepreneurship and encourage them to stay in Prince Albert to 
pursue self-employment opportunities.” 122  
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REDAs will also engage in activities directed at education and training in a 
particular sector. This is the case with the Carlton Trail REDA which partnered with 
Human Resources Development Canada and SIAST in 1998 to provide a 25 week 
training program to address a labor shortage in the hog industry in the Humboldt area. 
At the time that this initiative was reported, there had been “14 employees, with another 
two dozen candidates expected to help fill the labor gap”123 by the fall of 1998.  
Information: 
One of the more commonly used methods by REDAs to provide information is 
through the Community Profiles. The Prince Albert REDA, for example, provides 
profiles for all communities in the region. The information covers many areas including 
education and training, business development, real estate and housing, and taxation. The 
profiles section on “our area” or “our city” provides information on such things as the 
labour force, employment incomes, and education levels of the population. This 
information can be used by potential employers who are looking to locate in the 
region.124  
Research and Development: 
One of the more important functions performed by REDAs is providing 
individuals who are able to take the time to study the region, identify economic 
development problems or challenges and then bring them to the attention of people or 
organizations in the community who could potentially do something about them. One 
example is a study being done by the Prince Albert, Etomami Valley and North East 
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REDAs on the future potential of rail lines in the area. Rail service was identified by the 
REDAs as being “critical to the area and previous line abandonment has had severe 
impact on communities served by rail.”125 The study will serve as a source of 
information ready to be accessed if rail abandonment does come up.126 Contributions to 
the study came from the three REDAs and the Department of Highways and 
Transportation. This example illustrates that having an organization available to identify 
a problem allows for some action to be taken that will potentially mitigate negative 
developments.  
Another example comes from the Etomami Valley REDA which has produced a 
550 page Resource Manual outlining the opportunities in the area of value-added 
specialized forest products and agro-forestry. Within the document there “are over 50 
development ideas that are analyzed and assessed in their entirety.”127 
An example of a REDA that provides information, research and development 
and organizational development is the Regional Business Retention and Expansion 
Initiative from the Prince Albert REDA. This initiative asks that all businesses, “fill out 
a survey that deals with issues from finding suitable employees to projected trends in 
sales forecasts. This information will be compiled to address the specific needs and 
issues facing our local business community.”128 The ultimate goal of the initiative is to 
“be able to track the state of business in [the] region on an annual basis and ensure that 
… current businesses continue to thrive in a healthy business environment.” 129 
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Promotion and Marketing: 
Promotion and marketing is about raising the profile of the REDA and the region 
it represents. In order to do this, REDAs employ several different mechanisms and 
approaches. A common mechanism is for a REDA to provide news releases on projects 
on which it is working and paid advertising campaigns to bring awareness of the 
services REDAs offer. REDAs also prepare newsletters for the different stakeholders to 
keep them informed and updated on the projects and services the REDA delivers. At 
times a REDA will make it a priority to meet with members directly to keep them 
informed. As well, REDA staff attend community trade fairs in order to advertise the 
REDA membership to communities within the region. 130 
The Last Cattle Frontier organization headed by the Good Spirit REDA and 
Ducks Unlimited Canada is a unique example of both research and development and 
marketing. This initiative encourages farm families to move to east central 
Saskatchewan by identifying “the region’s competitive advantages” and then “looking at 
who would be interested in the land.”131 The initiative has identified opportunities in the 
area such as “land that has a strong carrying capacity for cattle, where droughts were 
few and far between and where there was little competition to drive up land prices.” 
Basically, there was a lot of quality land at low prices and The Last Cattle Frontier went 
to provinces like Alberta and B.C. to market the region to families that might be 
interested in taking advantage of the opportunity. As of January 2004, The Last Cattle 
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Frontier had about approximately 60 people who had either moved to the region or were 
interested in moving.132 
Local Projects and Initiative Management Assistance:  
This service is intended to identify and/or support potential business initiatives. 
This can mean that the REDA invests in a feasibility study which investigates the 
characteristics of the region and whether it is possible to start up an operation in the area.  
Two examples come from the RedCoat REDA in 2003 when they funded feasibility 
studies that looked at the potential for a mustard seed/sunflower oil plant and a chronic 
pain management centre at Gravelbourg.133  A further example comes from the 
Yellowhead REDA, which is involved in the Sunrise Cattle Corporation, a community 
owned cow/calf operation. The premise for the venture is for local producers to combine 
their resources in order to lower “the overwhelming risk and investment associated with 
the traditional costs of a start-up operation.”134 The Yellowhead REDA is recognized for 
the “considerable support” it has provided this corporation which includes assistance 
with the development of a business, budget and marketing plan.135 
Finally, the Southwest REDA provides a Community Strategic Planning 
Initiative. It is aimed at, “engaging communities to participate in professionally 
facilitated strategic planning workshops designed to identify trends in the community 
and surrounding area, development of a strategic and/or marketing plan, as well as 
giving members in the community the tools and the process to see the plan through to 
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success.”136  
 
3.4 Financial Framework of REDAs 
At the outset it was expected that REDAs would be financially self-sustaining 
entities. It was suggested in the Framework that “prevailing economic conditions and 
restraints absolutely preclude core funding for REDAs.” 137 By the time Phase II was 
implemented, however, it was determined that “fund-raising and related activities are 
proving to be both time-consuming and an uncertain base upon which to build 
permanent and continuous operations.”138 It was therefore concluded that all 28 REDAs 
in the province would receive core funding, provided they meet the guidelines set out for 
them. Recently, these guidelines and the amount of the core funding changed. In the 
2005/2006 provincial budget core-funding went from a cost-shared formula of $60,000 
per REDA to $75,000. If REDAs can secure $40,000 in outside funding and they meet 
other government requirements, then they will receive the $75,000.139   
The provincial government also provides funding through different mechanisms. 
One of the more prominent is the REDA Enhancement Fund (REF), created in 1998. 
The program provides, “cost-shared funding for regional project development which 
includes pre-feasibility studies, project business plans, project management costs and the 
program supports REDA partnerships and consolidations with other REDA regions.”140 
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Its intent is to “assist in the development of new projects that will directly generate 
meaningful economic benefit for the region.”141 The provincial government also recently 
increased this fund in the 2006/07 budget, doubling it from $150,000 to $300,000.”142 
This fund is available to all REDAs with a proposed project that meets the criteria for 
funding. It is common for two or more REDAs to partner on a project and apply for the 
funding.  In most cases the resources obtained from the REF are only a portion of the 
funding required for a particular project. The remaining funds come from other 
stakeholders or partners interested in the project or from the REDA itself. A few 
examples of the projects that have been financed in part by the REF are “a $31 million 
intensive livestock operation in Porcupine Plain; a $22 million ethanol plant in 
Weyburn; a $6 million golf course south of Saskatoon; a $2.4 million feed processing 
plant in Stoughton; and a $500,000 life lease housing project in Maple Creek.”143  
The provincial government also offers the REDA Youth Employment Initiative 
which offers $240,000 cost-shared fund to hire “young people, while helping REDAs to 
expand their services to local businesses.”144 The government will provide up to $10,000 
to hire a senior business student or graduate student based on 25 per cent local 
matching.145 The intent of the program is to “address the difficulties around finding 
employees who have the training required for business development, especially at an 
affordable cost.”146  
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In recent years the department of RECD has also created REDA “pilot” status 
which allows the department to “approve a REDA for ‘pilot’ status for purposes of 
testing new approaches or exploring enhancements to the REDA Program for future 
fiscal years.”147 One category of pilot status is the REDA strategic alliance. This “allows 
two or more REDAs to undertake joint strategic planning and to submit one directional 
document for their combined regions.”148 The advantage of the alliance is that it allows 
REDAs to “receive up to the maximum funding for all REDA programs for each REDA 
participating in the Strategic Alliance,” upon the condition that there is “a sufficient 
population base to ensure financial and governance sustainability into the future.”149 The 
intent of the program is to encourage REDAs to organize on a larger scale and 
encompass populations greater than 15,000 residents.  
Alternate funding for REDAs comes from various sources. In many cases this 
funding comes from municipal governments in the form of a membership fee on a per 
capita basis. In other cases, however, the municipality might decide to invest more or 
less depending on the relationship they have with the REDA.  Funding can also come 
from membership fees paid by businesses in the area. In return members often receive a 
variety of exclusive services such as discounts on business development seminars and 
advertising initiatives, promotion of the business/community at tradeshow events and 
preferential participation in a Business Retention and Expansion program.150 Some 
REDAs, however, do not charge any membership fees at all and instead opt for a 
funding strategy that relies solely or heavily on the investment of municipal 
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governments. The rationale is that it relieves the REDA from any pressure to pursue the 
priorities set out by any particular stakeholder and allows for a more holistic 
development approach whereby more stakeholders can be included in the process.151 
 REDAs have also been able to secure funding for particular projects through 
partnerships with other organizations. In these cases, a REDA may approach an 
organization that might have an interest in seeing a project come to fruition and will 
share funding for the project or even pass on the project for other organizations to 
pursue. One example is from the Moose Jaw REDA which began a project aimed at the 
NATO flying program. When it was realized that the initiative could not be advanced 
the way they wanted, they entered into a partnership with the Saskatchewan Indian 
Institute of Technologies in Saskatoon. The MJ REDA provided the background 
material and $10,000 toward the pre-feasibility work for an aircraft maintenance 
engineering and technician program.152 Other common methods for raising revenue 
have included contracting out administration services for other organizations or 
operating a Small Business Loan Association. 153 
 Other potential sources of funding are identified as shares in businesses; 
income from client services; sale of products; contributions or donations by residents; 
fund-raising; rental of equipment and facilities; federal and provincial non-core funding 
programs. The ratio that each contributes differs for each REDA. The government can 
be one of the largest or the smallest contributors in terms of financial resources. It really 
depends on the REDA. How involved its municipalities and businesses are, how well 
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the REDA is doing, the attitudes toward CED in the community and the entrepreneurial 
skills of its staff members are all factor in how much funding a REDA can secure.  
 
3.5 Financial Accountability Framework of REDAs 
 The role of the provincial government differs from that of the role of other 
stakeholders that partner with REDAs. One such role is providing oversight and control 
in relation to REDAs. The provincial government has the authority and power to ensure 
that REDAs are abiding by a minimal set of criteria to qualify for funding. Nine criteria 
are identified that must be met before core funding will be provided.  Some of these 
criteria include the expectation that REDAs be legally incorporated; have active status as 
a corporation; be approved under the REDA Initiative by the Minister of Saskatchewan 
Regional Economic and Cooperative Development; and provide annual audited financial 
statements prepared by an independent accountant.154   
The remaining criteria however, provide the government with greater oversight. 
For example, REDAs raise annual matching revenues of $40,000 in order to receive the 
core funding of $75,000. It is specifically noted, however, that these revenues cannot 
“involve federal and provincial government dedicated funding” or “local revenues 
intended for direct investment into projects/businesses, loans, and grants.”155  
Other expectations that give the government further control is the requirement 
that each REDA must invite a regional representative from the department “to attend 
REDA board meetings in a non-voting capacity”156 and that provincial funding provided  
after incorporation are only to be available following the submission and approval of a 
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negotiated, three year performance contract. This contract must include “an acceptable 
Directional Document that ensures the 7 community economic development core 
services … are provided in the region.”157 Furthermore, the expectation is that 
government funds will not be directed towards “services and activities that do not have a 
community economic development or economic development focus” or “services and 
activities involved in the actual construction, building or renovating of a project.”158 The 
government has conferred upon itself control over REDA operations; this control and its 
implications will be examined further in chapter four. 
Ultimately REDAs are responsible to their Board of Directors who are in turn 
responsible to the REDA stakeholders. In order to ensure funds are spent appropriately 
the Board of Directors reviews the interim financial statements on a monthly or bi-
monthly basis,159 If the auditors notice any financial mismanagement, then they are 
required to attach a note to the statement.160 As an independent organization, REDAs are 
required to deliver an audited financial statement to members annually.161 The 
Department of Regional Economic and Cooperative Development audits the financial 
reports for the portion of the funding provided by the Government of Saskatchewan. 
Other members such as municipalities are responsible for ensuring the portion of the 
funds they contribute are spent appropriately.  
The provincial government also implemented an evaluation framework to ensure 
that funds are used to their full potential. In the past, funding was granted based on 
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eligible revenues for eligible expenses. This meant that funding was tied to expectations 
such as the ones discussed above, but also to dollar amounts. A REDA official explains: 
If the REDA raised $40,000 then the government would 
grant the REDA $60,000, but they would have to spend 
the full $100,000 that the government approved of. If the 
REDA did not spend the full $100,000 or did not raise the 
full $40,000, then they would only be given that amount. 
So if they only raised $35,000, but spent $100,000, they 
would still get the $60,000 clawed back. As well, if they 
raised the $40,000, but did not spend the full $100,000, 
then the unused funds would be clawed back. If the REDA 
did not spend it all or raise it all, then at the beginning of 
the next year it would be taken back. 162  
 
Claw-backs on future funding occurred if a REDA fell short in raising its local matching 
funds or failed to spend the full amount of the funding. This system allowed the 
government to evaluate the REDA based on its expenditures. The rationale was that if 
the REDA failed to spend the funds or was unable to raise the funds, then it was 
performing poorly.  
In 2007 the government moved beyond this expenditure-based monitoring 
system to one of performance-based monitoring. The significant changes include “3 year 
performance contracts rather than annual contracts; rolling three year strategic plans 
rather than 3 year strategic plans; rolling 3 year work plans/deliverables charts rather 
than annual work plans; and no mid-year reporting process.”163 This system allows for 
longer term planning that will not change simply because a staff or board member 
leaves.  
The greatest advantage of this system is that it bases evaluation on performance 
rather than expenditures. Whether each REDA is able to spend its funds or raise enough 
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funds each year is not as important as whether they are delivering on the priorities they 
have identified in their work plans. If the government feels that the REDA is 
accomplishing enough and meeting the goals set out in its three year plan then they will 
grant the money. There will only be claw backs if the REDA had not delivered its 
clearly defined priorities: “The amount of the holdback will be determined by applying a 
percentage to the uncompleted work in relation to the total work plan,”164 but 
consideration will also be given to, “the ‘effort’ that the REDA has put into achieving its 
targets.”165 The new policy has only taken effect this past year. How it will affect 
operations and how strict the provincial government will be in its evaluation is 
unknown.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided an overview of the REDA program. REDAs are 
grassroots economic development organizations and as such the terms of their 
establishment and their operations are not dictated solely from top bureaucratic 
structures. The result of a bottom-up approach is that there is a great deal of flexibility 
granted to each REDA in how it will be organized and how it will operate. At the same 
time, however, the government does play a role in the organization and operation of 
REDAs, allowing for some consistency with the 28 REDAs in the province. It provides 
the general framework and REDA members attempt to operate within this framework 
while keeping in mind the unique interests and goals of the region it represents. The 
result is 28 REDAs that share common characteristics while simultaneously exhibiting 
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considerable differences. This overview has revealed that REDAs are different in terms 
of how they are organized, how they operate, and how they are financed to accomplish 
the various CED goals.  
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Chapter 4: 
 
Performance of REDAs 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Human and financial resources are two of the most critical elements 
required for the success of REDAs. Understanding what affects the performance of 
REDAS, however, extends beyond simply recognizing these two issues.  REDAs 
are a grassroots enterprise, driven by the people in Saskatchewan communities, but 
they came to life only because of the effort made by the provincial government to 
design a structure for their organization and to offer funding for their operation. 
The provincial government’s commitment to the program in terms of human and 
financial resources can have a tremendous impact on the capacity of REDAs to 
pursue CED.   
This chapter will therefore examine the role of the government in terms of 
its commitment to the growth and development of the capacity of REDAs to 
administer CED. There is a concern within CED literature that while a role for 
governments in CED is common and important, in many instances governments 
will not offer enough funding and support for the process. Some observers have 
suggested that politicians are investing in CED not necessarily because of their 
faith that it will turn around an economy, but because it allows politicians to shift 
the onus of economic development to the communities without the necessary 
support services for the process. Sean Markey, for example, in “Facing 
Uncertainty: Building Local Development Institutions in Rural British Columbia” 
writes that a government will often use CED as a rhetorical device to promote 
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community self-reliance.166 If it can be argued that a community should be 
responsible for its own development, then a provincial government can walk away 
from the responsibility, leaving the community to fend for itself.   
A similar, but less critical view is that while provincial governments may not be 
wholly abandoning communities in the CED process, they are still not committed to 
providing CED organizations with enough resources to operate as effectively as 
possible. A provincial government can support CED and even invest some resources, but 
it can also be using it as a political tool to show the public that the government is making 
efforts to address economic development in small or economically depressed 
communities.  
The Saskatchewan government, for example, will often portray REDAs as 
“shining examples of the partnerships that are building our economy,” and they will note 
that they are proud to “support local business through grants to [the] REDA network”167 
It will also produce news releases that highlight the various accomplishments made by 
REDAs throughout the province.168 The concern is not that the government announces 
support for the REDA program, but instead that this praise may simply be rhetoric rather 
than a genuine commitment to the grassroots economic development approach.   
As long as the government can cite the efforts of the organizations and some of 
the results, there may be little political need to ensure REDAs operate as effectively as 
possible. The creation and implementation of the REDA program therefore is not 
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necessarily the best indication of the government’s commitment. Accepting CED as a 
legitimate approach to economic development must be followed by a commitment to 
seeing the CED organization reaches its full potential.  
The common theme that permeated discussions with REDA officials was the 
lack of funding at their disposal. REDAs depend heavily on the human resources 
available to them, but limited funding impedes them from hiring and retaining qualified 
employees, just as it impedes a REDA from pursuing CED services. The remainder of 
this chapter examines the nature and scope of the financial and human resources which 
REDAs have at their disposal, with a special focus on the degree of monetary and non-
monetary support that they have been receiving from the provincial government.   
 
4.2 Impediments to Effective Operation  
The capacity and commitment of individual staff members and what they can 
contribute are essential elements of successful CED. Sean Markey noted that a CED 
organization’s capacity “is directly related to the capacity of the individuals working 
within them.”169 Evidence shows that “successes of LDOs [local development 
organizations] are often attributable to a very limited number of key individuals – in 
some cases, one individual – with exceptional energy, talents for innovation and 
technical skills.”170 The human resources available can be critical and it has even been 
suggested that “$35,000 for another staff member would go further than, say, $35,000 
for a bio-diesel project.”171 An EDO with the correct skill set can contribute more to 
some economic development projects through facilitation and support than money can 
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contribute for another project. The reality is that without qualified people working 
within CED “… all resources remain latent, untapped potential.”172  
Acquiring qualified individuals, however, can be difficult for REDAs that 
represent smaller rural areas. Often smaller communities have a scarcity of qualified 
persons and so REDAs look outside their communities to hire individuals. The difficulty 
is that REDAs in rural areas do not have the same appeal or ability to pay as the larger 
centers. Moreover, once individuals gain experience outside organizations tend to hire 
them and pay them more than the rural REDA can offer.173 For CED, experience with 
people and businesses in the region is as valuable as an education or an individual’s 
personal abilities. As one REDA official pointed out, “it takes about a year and a half to 
figure out the job … the little things about who to go to, where to look and to make the 
appropriate contacts.”174 REDAs that lose staff every few years must familiarize a new 
employee with the entire CED process. This stalls development and impedes the 
REDAs’ ability to operate effectively. 
This problem has been partly circumvented by hiring locally and by paying 
attention to the ties the individual has to the community. One official noted that after a 
series of staff members movied on, she began hiring prospective employees based less 
on criteria such as educational background or CED experience in another community, 
and more based on the ties that they had to the community.175 Hiring individuals with 
ties to the community meant that they were much less likely to look for positions in the 
larger urban centers. The importance of networking and contacts that come with growing 
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up in a region or owning a business in the region cannot be underestimated..176 The issue 
here was not that education was not valuable, but that there needs to be much more 
factored into the hiring process when one is dealing with smaller communities.  
While this approach is one way to deal with staff turnover rates it still contributes 
to two other challenges. The first is that as an employee’s skill level increases with 
education and experience, so too does the demand for a compensatory wage. As 
discussed in chapter three, there are different kinds of relationships that exist between 
REDA staff and their board of directors. For most CED organizations, success is more 
likely when “employees are more like associates in a common purpose than a source of 
labour purchased by capital.”177 Many REDAs had this kind of committed staff and the 
reality is that when individuals offer this kind of dedication, it must be appropriately 
compensated. Otherwise, individuals may move on to other opportunities or may simply 
limit what they are willing to invest in the job. As one REDA official noted, facilitating 
the CED process, “is not a ten dollar an hour job. There is a lot of personal involvement 
and responsibility involved.”178 To retain dedicated, qualified and experienced staff 
adequate wages must be offered and to do so, a REDA must have access to appropriate 
funds. 
The second challenge is that whereas obtaining an education while working for 
the REDA contributes to the capacity of the staff, it also contributes to the very real 
problem of burnout associated with this profession.  Many suggested that REDA staff 
were “pushed to the limit” because “working with such little money puts a lot of 
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pressure on the staff and it wears on them.”179 Dealing with the workload was a problem 
for many REDAs, large and small, and obtaining an education while very important, 
only adds to staff workloads. Being “severely understaffed”180 significantly affected 
their ability to meet the demands of the work presented to them. For many REDAs the 
problem is not so much a lack of projects to work on as it is a lack of people to deal with 
them. Viable projects are not developed because REDAs are unable to find the financial 
resources to hire additional staff. This limits the contributions REDAs can make to 
economic development.  
Workloads can also have unintentional consequences for volunteers, who are 
considered a vital part of the operation of REDAs. If staff members are overloaded, a lot 
of work can be transferred to volunteer board members who have commitments and 
interests outside of the work they do for the REDAs.181 Burnout, therefore, is also a 
serious problem encountered by volunteers. With enough qualified staff, however, the 
workload can be managed effectively and it would not be necessary for volunteer board 
members to take on more than they can handle. Additional funding to hire more staff 
would relieve the workload for REDA staff and volunteers which would avoid the 
problems of burnout as well as allowing for more economic development projects to be 
managed at once. This could have a positive effect on the amount of economic 
development occurring in the region.  
A REDA official also noted that the department of RECD was failing to support 
REDAs because the government never comes up with any serious economic 
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development leads despite the amount of employees in the department.182 While a 
legitimate concern, this is simply another facet of the understaffing issue faced by 
REDAs. As grassroots enterprises, REDA should have the lead responsibility for 
economic development, not the provincial government. If REDAs were adequately 
staffed they would not have to look to the provincial government to provide economic 
development leads or to deal with economic development concerns.  
REDA officials also expressed general discontent over the amount of funding 
made available to pursue CED projects. Funding has stayed fairly constant over the 
years and the REF, while considered a good funding scheme, is deemed as being 
insufficient given that it must be shared by all 28 REDAs. The concern is that “there are 
really good projects that could not be done because the money wasn’t there.” 183,184 
With the resources to hire staff and fund projects the entire capacity of the 
REDA is enhanced, allowing them to accomplish more in the region. And success 
breeds success.  The more a REDA accomplishes, the more their profile is elevated. It 
was suggested by REDA officials that this kind of positive attention can contribute to 
improvements in many different areas. Specifically, a positive profile will inform local 
residents of the work that REDAs are doing. This entices them to enquire about creating 
or expanding a business. As well, it was expressed that the more a REDA accomplishes, 
the more volunteers are attracted to the process. If a REDA is doing well and producing 
results, people are more confident that contributing to the process will effect change and 
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perhaps contribute to development. Success in a project, they suggested, attracted 
volunteers.185 
Pessimistic attitudes about economic development can be tackled by a REDA if 
it is able to produce development results. While there are positive attitudes between and 
among the CED community, a significant change from the days of RDCs, there is still 
work to be done on the attitudes of the community at large. One REDA board member 
stated that his motivations for getting involved with the local REDA stemmed largely 
from the positive attitudes that the REDA embodied. He enjoyed getting away from the 
negativity of ‘coffee row’ that many community members exhibit.186 The indication was 
that outside of the CED community there is still a lot of effort that needs to be made to 
change the attitudes of some people in Saskatchewan communities.  
This corresponds with the findings of Karla Radloff who reported that among 
CED organizations in Saskatchewan, “almost 85% of respondents affirmed that their 
organization undertakes specific initiatives to improve attitudes and create optimism.”187 
The indication was that “a large majority of respondents saw a role for their organization 
in creating positive dialogue within their community.”188 The work a REDA does can 
affect economic development and, as one official noted, this can be “a catalyst for 
positive attitudes.”189 A successful REDA with a positive profile can go a long way in 
changing the attitudes of community members. After a success, people are that much 
more willing to contribute to the process. As one official stated: “in every community 
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there are nay sayers but once you have a success story then the next [project] is that 
much easier.”190 
 
4.3 Non-Monetary Contributions 
4.3.1 Transfer of Government Control 
There is concern within CED literature that the provincial and federal 
governments will attempt to exert too much control over the CED process. The 
suggestion is that governments must remain flexible;191 they must be willing to transfer 
funding to the community without conditions. Undue government control violates the 
grassroots principle that underpins CED. If government dictates the terms under which 
funds will be granted, then the community loses control. The difficulty is that while this 
principle is repeated often,192 there are rarely any details that accompany it. There are 
not any defined criteria against which government involvement can be measured. 
What does exists are a variety of opinions held by those who believe that there 
should be “extreme measures to exclude government control” to those who see a “need 
for some coordinating and reporting mechanisms.”193 Donald J. Savoie suggests that “in 
their funding agreements, the federal and provincial governments should clearly state 
that they will not interfere with or second guess, in any way, the decisions made at the 
local level.”194 The concern is that the governments should be supportive and not 
directive because if they are directive the issue of accountability is clouded. This is a 
legitimate observation and is one that arises often in CED literature.  
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Having stated this, however, there is evidence which suggests that given the right 
structure and purpose, some restrictions can actually strengthen CED. The ECC sees a 
role for some level of government control because it builds in “a requirement for 
discipline in the use of funds.”195 Working within some boundaries creates a useful tool 
for evaluation and planning and it also serves as a reporting mechanism to the 
community about the progress of development efforts.196 
Given this argument some conclusions can be made about the relationship 
between the Saskatchewan government and REDAs. The Department of Regional 
Economic and Cooperative Development (RECD) requires that REDAs use government 
funding to engage in wealth creation activities. Some REDA officials expressed concern 
over the guidance that the government offers. It was noted that the provincial 
government will sometimes withhold funding if a project a REDA is working on does 
not correspond with the philosophy of the government.197 There have been occasions 
where conflict has occurred because the department and a REDA have different 
perspectives on what should be a priority. The government’s philosophy is that REDAs 
should be engaged in activities that lead to wealth creation.198 To fulfill this objective, 
the government denies funding to REDA activities that do not lead to economic growth. 
Therefore, activities like the building or renovating of a project, investing in the 
development of seniors’ home complex, or investing in a community beautification 
project fall outside the scope of what the government will support.199  
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This restriction does indicate government control over the process, but this 
involvement can be characterized as one of facilitation and not as undue interference. 
Limiting the use of government dollars for wealth creation activities simply means that 
REDAs must pursue services that fall into one or more of the seven CED categories 
(coordination, organizational development and planning, education and training, 
information, research and development, promotion and marketing, local projects and 
initiative management assistance). Within these broad categories REDAs can pursue 
whatever they choose. They are not limited to traditional elements of economic 
development activities,200 but instead can engage in actions that will also empower 
community members. For example, many REDAs will organize youth strategies that 
focus on encouraging entrepreneurship through education. The goal is to locate and 
encourage untapped entrepreneurial talent that exists within the community. This sort of 
CED, while still aimed at wealth creation through the development of entrepreneurial 
capacity, is also about building networks and broadening social ties through the 
community. It is about getting the people within the community more engaged and more 
concerned about the future success of their community.  
REDA activities can also serve both social and economic objectives. The 
Gateway REDA, for example, approached the government with a proposal to use 
funding from the government to do fundraising for a new hospital in the area. With 35% 
of the cost being covered by the local area,201 the REDA wanted to get involved. Initially 
the provincial department was reluctant, but once it was communicated that fundraising 
would help to maintain 200 jobs at the hospital the provincial government was on 
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board.202 While the ultimate objective is maintaining employment, the region also 
benefits from a new hospital that serves an essential social service need.  
It is also worth noting that while the provincial government has a set of 
expectations, it does not completely restrict REDAs from pursuing the objectives it 
considers important. REDAs are able to do whatever they choose with non-core-funding.  
Gateway REDA, for example, has decided to address the housing needs and support 
services of the seniors in the area.203 While this project may have positive consequences 
for the community, it is not a project with an economic focus and therefore not one the 
government would support. Nevertheless, the REDA is free to use funds it secures from 
outside sources to pursue such a project. The Gateway REDA has determined that this is 
a worthy project and has gone ahead with it. This decision is the discretion of the 
REDA, and the provincial government does not interfere with such decisions.204 
Finally, it is important to note that it is the REDA that articulates what is within 
the interests of the community to pursue.205 It is in the position to know what the 
community is capable of and what the community would be willing to pursue. The hog 
industry, for example, is not supported by every community and so the department 
leaves a choice such as this to the REDA and the community. Ultimately it is the REDA 
that determines the direction it wants to take for economic development.  
By maintaining a degree of control but also granting considerable flexibility, the 
provincial government has balanced its role as a co-manager well. Provincial officials 
define the guidelines, but within those broad guidelines and with funds from outside 
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sources, REDAs are in a position to pursue virtually anything they consider important.  
As the ECC suggests, there is a place for certain restrictions in the CED process. In fact, 
there was a sentiment voiced by REDA officials in favor of an overarching body that 
provided direction and guidelines for the program. The grassroots approach, one REDA 
official stated, is chaotic and guidelines are needed to ensure structure and 
organization.206 The government imposes some restrictions to keep REDAs focused on 
the overall objective of wealth creation, but it still grants them a degree of flexibility to 
pursue what they want. The control is simply about providing some necessary structure 
or parameters to the boundless grassroots approach.  
 
4.3.2 Transfer of Human Resources 
The government of Saskatchewan, through the delivery of consistent support 
services, has contributed to the evolution of the REDA program. In the last thirteen 
years, the Department responsible for REDAs has been seriously engaged in 
contributing its own human resources to ensure REDAs were first established and then 
that the community and REDA personnel had the capacity to engage in the CED 
process. Between 1993 and 2006 the role of the Department of Economic Development, 
which has been renamed as the Department of Regional Cooperative and Economic 
Development (RECD), was to aid in the process of establishing REDAs across the 
province and to assist the organizations in developing both their human and 
organizational capacity.207 At the outset, the provincial government offered REDAs and 
members of their respective communities training sessions in CED practices and has 
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since worked with the Saskatchewan Economic Developers Association (SEDA)208 to 
offer an “introductory course for new economic development practitioners and 
volunteers on economic development boards and committees.”209 In more recent years, 
the department has offered training courses to REDA board members210 and has also 
worked with the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association (SUMA) and the 
Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM) through the “Clearing the 
Path” initiative, to deliver similar training to Saskatchewan municipalities.211  
Getting communities on board to participate in a regionally based development 
approach was one of the challenges that needed to be addressed through education and 
training. The narrow community centered focus was stifling development and the 
benefits of inter-community cooperation and partnerships needed to be encouraged. The 
result is that both REDAs and the communities they represent have largely embraced the 
regional approach. One REDA official stated that “there is a very positive and 
cooperative relationship among the members of [this] region. If [this town] does well 
then everyone cheers.”212 Another stated that in terms of a particular project that was 
being worked on it was “just remarkable how closely the community is working 
together.”213 This does not mean that there is no turf protection between REDAs or 
between communities, but that the vicious and counterproductive competition that 
existed in the past has largely disappeared. The indication is that there is a new mindset 
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that if one wants to improve the economic conditions of their region, they must embrace 
neighboring regions and communities.214  
Through encouragement and support services from the provincial government 
many REDAs are now functioning much more successfully, but there are still occasions 
when a REDA faces some difficulties. REDAs can sometimes fluctuate in their capacity. 
For example, in 1999 the CTREDA was acknowledged as “one of the most successful in 
the whole province”215 More recently however, the CTREDA has had to undergo 
organizational restructuring due to financial instability and has looked to the Department 
of Industries and Resources for support.216 Today, with government support, the 
CTREDA is in a more stable position and continues to operate. The CTREDA, staffed 
by a single individual, is now working on an ambitious strategy to retain immigrants in 
rural Saskatchewan.  
There are also times when a REDAs staff or board members have little 
experience in CED. A department official stated that in these cases the department will, 
“work closely with these organizations to monitor their activities and to assist them in 
building their organizational capacity both at the board and staff level.”217 This may 
mean sitting down with an EDO and posing questions and sharing research to come up 
with a strategic plan. Or, it may mean providing a pathway to the provincial government. 
As well, regional offices often keep REDAs informed of new programs offered by the 
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government and help them to get their initiatives processed through the provincial 
bureaucracy.218 At times, support may also mean letting an EDO in an office with only 
one staff member realize that while the task of economic development is large for just 
one person, it can be achieved through partnering and building relationships.219  
There are times, however, when support from the provincial department or the 
regional offices is not considered adequate. A serious concern expressed by REDA 
officials was that responsibilities that fall within the stated realm of the regional offices 
are being offloaded on the REDAs. Based on this observation, there is reason to suggest 
that while the provincial government department has provided valuable support in the 
past, there is room for improvement in providing assistance for some of the services that 
REDAs  are expected to provide.  
 
4.3.3 Evaluation 
In more recent years the provincial government has initiated one of the more 
important contributions it can offer the REDA program. When the government first 
created REDAs in 1993 it engaged in an in-depth evaluation of the RDC program and 
identified several challenges. Based on these challenges the entire RDC program was 
overhauled and REDAs were created. In the fourteen years that have passed since the 
creation of REDAs the government has wanted to see these organizations develop. The 
difficulty is that there has been little by way of an organized evaluation of the REDA 
program. There has been no formal procedure put in place to evaluate whether REDAs 
functioned well under the organizational framework designed for them or whether the 
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funding they received was adequate. For over a decade REDAs largely remained the 
same in terms of their organization and funding structure.  
In 2005, however, through the leadership of Clay Serby, the Minister responsible 
for REDAs, the REDA Working Group was created to review and address both the 
financial and organizational challenges REDAs face. The working group is comprised of 
five REDA board members and five REDA staff from various regions across the 
province.220 The objective of the group is to “provide practical advice to the Department 
of [Regional Economic and Cooperative Development] on provincial government 
policies, programs and initiatives that will foster and support an environment for 
sustainable rural regional economic development, and to monitor the department’s use 
of this advice.”221 The working group allows REDA officials to get together and express 
common concerns and challenges and with a collective resolve they can present the 
department with issues that need to be addressed. In turn, RECD can go to the 
Department of Finance and the Treasury Board with proposals for such things as funding 
increases and organizational changes. 
Since its inception the Working Group negotiated a 25% increase in funding – 
the first funding increase granted since REDAs were created. It was also the force 
behind the move to three year performance based contracts rather than expenditure 
based ones. Previously, REDAs were penalized based solely on dollars spent, a process 
which was not viewed as an effective way to evaluate the efforts REDAs were making. 
Another worthy effort of the working group has been a protocol document. This 
document “sets out the roles and responsibilities within a region for what the REDA is 
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responsible for undertaking and what the Department of Regional Economic and 
Cooperative Development is responsible for.”222 This document serves to partly prevent 
regional offices and REDAs from offloading responsibilities, one of the problems 
identified by a REDA official and discussed earlier in this chapter. 
 More recently the Working Group has flagged the issue of equitable funding and 
is looking to address concerns over the fact that each REDA receives equal funding 
despite variances in such things as size, efforts or performance. 223 The ECC writes that 
“local economic development approaches do not work economic magic: improvement is 
only possible where the potential for it exists.”224 Without this potential, engaging in 
CED remains a fruitless task and governments should therefore be cautious about the 
communities they are willing to support. This idea is also supported by Donald Savoie 
who highlights some of the characteristics that equip some communities with greater 
capacity than others. One characteristic is a diverse economy made up of many different 
small businesses as opposed to one or two large employers. Another is a community that 
has a cooperative history. They tended to rally together to face a crisis and plan new 
economic activities.225  
Despite the variation in community capacity, each REDA is granted equal 
funding.  Increases in core funding, therefore, while desperately needed by some 
REDAs, are not as seriously required by others. Such a funding structure can be very 
limiting for those REDAs that are very active or that have a significant amount of 
potential in the regions they represent. There is evidence which suggests that more funds 
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directed at REDAs with considerable workloads is merely part of taking advantage of 
the potential that exists in particular areas of Saskatchewan. The fact is that communities 
vary in their stages of economic development and their administrative infrastructure. 
Therefore, initiating a funding scheme that accounts for the potential in a particular 
region may be an appropriate reform to REDA funding. The Working Group is looking 
to review this issue.  
The Working Group allows for collaboration that moves beyond simply 
reporting successes. It is an overarching body that evaluates REDAs as a whole and 
allows many aspects of the program to be considered. REDA officials have specialized 
knowledge about the structure and operation of REDAs and this knowledge contributes 
to providing innovative ideas to address challenges. The move to performance contracts 
is an example. As well, this kind of comprehensive evaluation gives an impetus for 
collaboration on the challenges REDAs face and the justifications for change. It has 
been due to the establishment of the Working Group that the issue of equitable funding 
has been flagged and that initiatives such as performance contracts have been 
introduced.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
Commitment from the provincial government to CED has been measured against 
its willingness to transfer enough financial and human resources to support the CED 
efforts of REDAs. Some critics suggest that governments are more concerned with 
political gains than the community economic development gains that can be made 
through the efforts of organizations like REDAs. Although there may be some political 
considerations in the creation and operation of REDAs, the information presented in this 
 80 
chapter shows that the Saskatchewan government has displayed a considerable amount 
of commitment to REDAs. It has been willing to provide substantial support services to 
get REDAs operational and functioning independently. It has provided training sessions 
to communities in order to educate individuals about the economic development process 
and it continues to provide support through the Department of RECD.  
At the inception of the REDA initiative, the primary concern was to ensure 
REDAs were sufficiently staffed with trained individuals that were knowledgeable in the 
CED process. There was a considerable effort on behalf of the government to offer 
education and training to communities willing to accept it. The internal capacity of 
REDAs was limited. In turn, this limited the effect that increased financial contributions 
could offer. The first priority was increasing the ability of REDAs to manage CED in 
their respective communities. In the meantime, funding contributions such as the REF 
and the youth initiative were offered to address some of the problems associated with 
deficient human and financial resources.  As well, the $60,000 core funding has allowed 
many REDAs to continue to operate and has provided a level of organizational stability 
that otherwise may not have been available for such organizations. Admittedly, there are 
problems associated with the shortages REDAs face, but there has been a considerable 
amount of support services offered to REDAs and at the very least there is funding 
REDAs can depend on.  
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Chapter 5:  
 
Conclusion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The central objective of this thesis has been to examine the economic and 
political factors that led to the creation of REDA’s, the functions which they perform 
and the general strategies they employ in doing so, and the factors that might be 
affecting their ability to perform their functions effectively. The objective in this 
concluding chapter is to summarize the findings and provide some recommendations on 
how to improve the effectiveness of REDAs as instruments of CED in Saskatchewan.    
 
5.2 Major Findings 
 As a policy option, CED is an attractive approach. It is defined by the principle 
that organizations and individuals can and should be engaged in the economic future of 
their community. Not surprisingly, this is appealing to governments. The new economic 
order that emerged in the 1980s has created new opportunities as well as challenges and, 
as Donald J. Savoie suggests, if it has taught us anything, it is that senior levels of 
government do not always have the tools to address economic stagnation or decline.226  
CED is a shift away from the notion that the federal and provincial governments on their 
own can rescue a community from economic decline. Generating self-sufficiency allows 
a community to depend on its own effort and ingenuity rather than relying on the federal 
or provincial governments for a solution it likely cannot provide.  
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 The appeal of CED to Saskatchewan’s provincial governments has been 
apparent. Both the Devine and Romanow governments created or supported a variety of 
CED initiatives and both recognized and valued the need for an economic development 
governance framework at the sub-provincial level to deal with economic development 
concerns through cooperation. While substantial changes were made to REDAs to 
provide a more coordinated approach to CED, the fundamental principles and structures 
that defined the RDC program were emulated by REDAs. RDCs served as the 
conceptual foundation for REDAs. Both were organizations composed of a board of 
director and staff to pursue economic development goals on a regional scale, both 
emphasized the principles of cooperation and coordination in their mandate, and both 
focused on community involvement.  
Despite the similarities however, there were some noteworthy differences 
between the approaches the different governments took to regional development. When 
elected in 1991, the Romanow government inherited a significant deficit, one that 
defined the economic environment under which the administration would govern. With 
limited financial means and the lack of success the Devine government had in 
stimulating growth through government spending, the Romanow government had little 
reason to pursue strategies that would insert government into the workings of the 
economy. Lessons of the past prompted Romanow to see the government as the 
facilitator, rather than the main driver, of economic growth. This required less 
government involvement in community economic development and more facilitation of 
partnerships between labour, business and the public sector.    
 The economic environment would also prompt the government to consider ways 
to deal with what was considered the inefficient duplication of services that existed 
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throughout Saskatchewan. The increasing trend of urbanization in Saskatchewan and the 
persistent depopulation of rural Saskatchewan have caused severe infrastructure 
problems. The duplication of services, in light of the economic situation the Romanow 
government found itself in, was no longer sustainable. In response, regionalization was 
considered as a potential solution. In terms of the economy, it was argued by Jack 
Stabler, Rose Olfert and Murray Fulton that unless the government started to target 
investment into specific growth centers that supported the surrounding regions, they 
would run the risk of losing the centers that were currently economically viable.227 
Government dollars could no longer be stretched to sustain each and every 
Saskatchewan community and the services it offered.  
 REDAs were a product of the unique economic situation the Romanow 
government faced upon election in 1991. The desire to remove government from the 
workings of the economy created a serious interest in the idea of a sub-provincial body 
that encouraged economic development through the effort and ingenuity of the people at 
the local level. Through the facilitation and support of REDAs, the government could 
encourage growth without getting directly involved. This had appeal for two reasons. 
The first was that it accounted for the limited means the government had to pursue other 
options that would address Saskatchewan’s economy. In financial terms, the government 
was severely limited in what it could invest. In practical terms, it had limited options. 
REDAs were a way of empowering people in the communities to invest in their own 
economic future by facilitating and supporting local economic development initiatives.  
The second was that REDAs would be a move away from supporting an under-
developed organizational infrastructure in Saskatchewan. This was accomplished in two 
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ways. The first is that REDAs themselves would be larger units representing more 
communities. The second is that REDAs, as larger regional bodies, would allow 
investments to be used to support regions rather than individual communities. The 
Stabler, Olfert and Fulton study conducted at the time revealed that without an economic 
strategy that focused on specific regional trading areas, the province risked the decline 
of some of centers that were economically strong. More specifically, they indicated that 
changes were needed that centered on the concept of regionalization, whereby the 
economic development function would be integrated into one organization representing 
an entire region. Rather than each community requesting funds from different levels of 
government for their own specific projects, REDAs would consider what was in the 
interest of the region to pursue. REDAs would aid in the process of determining where 
resources should be targeted, decreasing the likelihood that each community would 
continue to support and develop infrastructure that would be underused, thereby 
contributing to a more efficient use of resources and also the economic sustainability of 
Saskatchewan.   
 The transition from RDCs to REDAs received some negative attention in the 
legislature. The questions surrounded the wisdom from the NDP government that 
‘bigger is somehow better” and the regionalization initiatives that were being 
implemented at the time. The concern was the government was abandoning these 
communities and pulling out their offices, schools and economic development offices. 
One former RDC official also noted the concern of some residents that without an 
economic development office, their communities would be getting much less individual 
attention. Today however, there is very little documented about the transition and even 
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those that lived through it tend to acknowledge the need for the transition to larger 
economic development bodies.  
REDAs were expected to have a minimum number of communities within their 
respective boundaries, they would be financially accountable to their stakeholders 
groups, and they would be provided dedicated core funding by the Saskatchewan 
government. Along with the application of core-funding, however, also came core 
funding guidelines. These principles have evolved over the years but they essentially 
define the parameters of what REDAs are required to do in order to receive core 
funding. Among these guidelines is the requirement that REDAs create a strategic plan 
and that they pursue activities that fall within the seven CED categories defined by the 
Saskatchewan government.   
There are many factors that influence what REDAs pursue and how they 
organize, but a major characteristic of the grassroots approach is for the government, as 
a facilitator of this process, to show considerable respect for the direction the 
communities wish to take the process.  Accordingly, while REDAs display a degree of 
similarities due to the provincial government’s requirements, they also display 
considerable flexibility in how they organize, the objectives they pursue and the manner 
in which they access funding. In terms of organization, while most REDAs are 
comprised of a board of directors and staff members there are exceptions to this. It is 
sometimes the case that the boards of directors are the staff members. Similarly, while it 
is common for most REDAs to collect membership fees from communities and 
stakeholder groups in the region, there are REDAs that choose to rely solely on what 
municipalities are willing to grant each year so as to be less exclusionary in the members 
they serve.   
 86 
It is perhaps the functions that REDAs perform, however, that show the most 
variation. All REDAs are expected to provide coordination. In this respect, they must 
ensure that that there is limited duplication of CED services in the area and that 
members of the region can easily direct the CED services required. Beyond coordination 
however, REDAs are engaged in a variety of activities. They can range from organizing 
educational workshops and showcases, advertising for the REDA and the region, 
producing community profiles and generally supporting anyone interested in starting a 
business. What REDAs pursue and the capacity they have to pursue it is largely tied to 
the individuals working with the REDA and some of the natural characteristics of the 
region. If, for example, there is already significant cooperation between communities or 
significant support from the member municipalities, then pursuing particular objectives 
can be made a lot easier.  
For those who see potential in the CED approach, support from across the 
political spectrum and both sides of the legislature is encouraging. If elected officials 
continue to view CED as a legitimate option, there will continue to be a willingness to 
pursue it. The danger, however, is that there are always a variety of political 
considerations that affect the level of government involvement.  Within the CED 
literature there have been some concerns expressed about government involvement. 
CED shifts the responsibility for economic development to the organizations and 
individuals in the local and regional communities. While this approach is appealing for 
both the government and the community, it can also be problematical in that it can 
excuse the government from investing adequate resources in the process. The limited 
capacity of a CED organization’s performance can be of little concern for a government 
that wishes to only achieve the political benefits of maintaining the appearance of an 
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effort to address economic development or rural decline. Limited support can be the 
result of a government that does not have any genuine interest or faith in what CED can 
offer.  
 There has been at least some indication that Saskatchewan’s provincial 
government has been unwilling to fully equip REDAs to meet their objectives. Some 
REDA officials believe that limited provincial funding and access to own source 
revenues has severely restricted their ability to pursue economic development. One 
aspect of their operation that has been adversely affected is securing adequate staff and 
volunteers. Limited funding has meant that many REDAs cannot offer the wages to 
attract or retain qualified and experience employees. Staff turnover can be detrimental to 
a REDA because it can take up to two years for new staff members to familiarize 
themselves with the economic development process in a region. As well, limited funding 
often means that extra staff cannot be hired; consequently the entire economic 
development portfolio rests on a single staff member. This often means that the 
workload is offloaded onto volunteers. Burnout was a common concern among REDA 
officials who complained about the increasing demands that went along with being 
involved in the economic development mission.   
 Despite the limited funding available to REDAs and the effect that this has had, 
and will likely continue to have, on their operations, there is considerable evidence to 
suggest that the provincial government has made substantial non-monetary contributions 
that have positively affected REDA performance. When the NDP government decided to 
pursue the REDA initiative it developed an organizational framework and principles for 
their creation and operation. At the same time funding guidelines were created, 
including the conditions under which REDA funding would be granted. Although there 
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is some concern that this kind of government involvement can compromise the CED 
exercise, this thesis has demonstrated that this has afforded REDAs a necessary degree 
of structure that may otherwise not have been accomplished. As the ECC argues, by 
implementing guidelines and encouraging REDAs to prioritize their activities, the 
government inserts a valuable tool for evaluation, planning, and reporting on progress.  
The provincial government has also facilitated the performance of REDAs by 
contributing to the recruitment and development of human resources. This was 
necessary because many communities throughout Saskatchewan, especially those facing 
out migration and economic decline, did not have the skilled personnel that could easily 
step into an economic development position. As the human and organizational capacity 
of REDAs continued to increase, they relied less extensively on the support services 
offered by provincial government departments. Today, many REDAs are relatively self-
sufficient, but the provincial department is there to provide help when necessary.  
 Finally, the government has initiated an important annual evaluation process 
headed by the REDA Working Group which consists of members from different REDAs 
to review and assess issues that affect the operation and programming of the entire 
REDA system. For many years the REDA system were not subjected to any kind of 
comprehensive review of their operations, programming, or accountability framework. 
REDAs operated according to the same structure under which they were established 
even though there was little that was available that could inform policy makers about the 
most effective system.  
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5.3 Major Recommendations  
The commitment from the government to provide education and training and a 
systematic evaluation process has greatly enhanced the capacity of the REDAs. Many 
REDAs today operate with more qualified board members, employees, and volunteers 
than they did in the past. This is a great accomplishment given that human resources are 
an essential element of the success of CED. In addition, in less than a year, the REDA 
Working Group has provided a review of the REDA program that has already 
contributed to significant positive changes. Changes have included much needed funding 
increases and alterations to the accountability framework. It is important not to 
underestimate the significance of an evaluation procedure. It allows REDAs to be 
strengthened and evolve as institutions. A review process allows the provincial 
department responsible for community economic development the opportunity to 
examine if the existing framework is effective or whether changes are required. 
Therefore, continuing the support for the REDA Working Group and continuing to make 
an effort to respond to its recommendations will be necessary in the future.  
 Limited funding continues to impede REDA performance. This was the single 
most prevalent issue that permeated discussion with REDA officials and it is cause for 
concern. The government has made significant contributions, but as organizationally 
self-sufficient institutions, the potential of REDA is limited by their limited access to 
funding. Fluctuations in the capacity of REDAs will remain an issue as long as high 
turnover rates continue. For REDAs to seriously pursue CED they need to be able to 
retain qualified, experienced and dedicated staff that can initiate and pursue innovative 
strategies and programming. All of this will require increases in funding allocated to the 
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REDAs. The funds will have to come wither from the provincial government or the 
REDA partners or both.   
Added to this is that as the CED process matures increasing demands are placed 
on REDAs and their staff. The coordination of CED efforts among the key stakeholders 
within each region has been and continues to be a concern. This includes coordination 
between and among Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal agencies. In some instances 
overlapping mandates can lead to duplicated and wasted efforts. An objective being 
considered, therefore, is for REDAs to partner with Aboriginal economic development 
agencies in the province.228 While a legitimate objective, this is another responsibility 
being placed on REDAs and with added responsibility must come a consideration of 
what kind of added human or financial resources will be received.  
If funding increases are considered, then provincial department responsible for 
REDAs will have to also consider amendments to the current funding formula. In 
chapter four, equitable funding was discussed and it was shown that some REDAs 
represent areas with greater potential than others. This could be due to the availability of 
qualified personnel or the geography and resources in the area. Currently, the 
government offers core funding to each REDA in the province regardless of their size, 
potential revenue bases, efforts to develop and achieve strategic projects and programs, 
or accomplishments. In order to maximize the potential of the REDAs that have shown 
or that may show strong performance in the future, the government will need to consider 
a funding structure that accounts for these differences among REDAs.    
 Another issue to consider is the role that municipalities play in the REDA 
program. For some REDAs, the issue is that the province is one of the smallest 
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contributors and over the years has increased its funding only minimally compared to the 
municipalities in the region. For others, however, the municipalities were identified as 
less than optimal financial contributors. This overall lack of funding is put into 
perspective by a REDA official: “Funding has to come from the province and the cities, 
but ideally the city has to understand and realize that this is an important thing to do. It is 
a goal of the city to grow and diversify the economy and grow the population and make 
it more about exports and less about imports and growth of the labor force. These 
expectations unfortunately are not backed up by sufficient funding.” 229 Although the 
municipalities want to see results, they are often not willing to contribute the resources 
required to make further and sustained progress. If the provincial government is 
expected to make the commitment to REDAs, then so too should the municipalities.  Of 
course, this recommendation is made with caution. This cannot be used as an excuse for 
the province to simply offload the economic development responsibility. Instead, there 
could be a cost-shared funding formula designed to encourage financial support from 
municipalities.230  
 Although it is reasonable to suggest Saskatchewan’s provincial government has 
implemented a balanced structure for the operations of REDAs, the ECC reported that 
serious concerns exist about the level of government restrictions in the CED process. It 
also reported that there was the indication that funding from the government should be 
granted with no expectations tied to it.231 Similarly, based on four case studies in 
Atlantic Canada, Donald J. Savoie, concluded that there was reason to believe that any 
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interference from the government could be detrimental.232 This conclusion was drawn 
from a particular set of case studies where decision making power was not clear and this 
absence of direction created a barrier to economic development.  In those case studies 
involvement from the government interfered with the CED process, but this does not 
necessarily mean that it would be equally damaging in the case of the Saskatchewan 
REDAs.  
In terms of CED literature, therefore, there may be cause for further research into 
the funding structure that the government has created for REDAs. It has been argued in 
this thesis that the Saskatchewan government has created a funding structure that 
balances both the need for structure and direction for the REDAs’ efforts and that it also 
allows for flexibility for REDAs to pursue the CED objectives they consider necessary. 
Despite these findings, however, there are some strong objections within the CED 
literature to this kind of involvement by government. It could likely be argued that what 
the Saskatchewan government has designed for REDAs is unduly restrictive and 
counterproductive for purposes of CED. The objective of this thesis, however, was not 
necessarily to make a judgment about what level of government involvement is 
appropriate. Instead, the purpose was to provide research which would lead to further 
research on CED. It is recommended, therefore, that some of the information presented 
in this thesis about the framework for REDA funding and some of the conclusions be 
used for further analysis in CED literature. An analysis that addresses what the 
objectives of CED should be and whether the provincial government involvement is 
consonant with such objectives is necessary.  
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Finally, there is reason to suggest that REDAs continue to represent regions that 
are too small. In 2000, following the release of a report on economic development in 
rural Saskatchewan which suggested that the province should be divided into no more 
than 17 regional municipalities, a journalist stated that, “although the province now has a 
number of regional economic development authorities (REDAs), there are too many of 
them to be functional -- in spite of the hard work many people involved do.”233 Although 
not often reported by REDA officials as a significant concern, the research by Olfert and 
Stabler shows that economic development needs to take into account the regional trading 
centers and the effective use of the surrounding territory and communities in the region. 
The size of REDAs, therefore, will continue to be a concern for the provincial 
government as it seeks to find new ways of encouraging partnerships between existing 
REDAs.  
Despite some significant differences among them, it is fair to say that REDAs 
have achieved a modicum of success in CED. It is also fair to say that collectively many 
of them have faced substantial challenges which have limited their ability to achieve 
optimal success. REDAs have the potential to contribute to the economic well-being of 
Saskatchewan. Top-down approaches that attempt to maintain a community’s economic 
base through the influx of government dollars are not a long-term solution. Instead of 
relying on government to sustain a community, there is the possibility that economic 
growth can occur through the commitment and support from those at the community 
level. Of course, the key is the commitment that comes from the community, the 
minister, and those working at the departmental level.  
                                                 
233 Anonymous, “Report wants to see fewer than 17 rural municipalities,” Moose Jaw Herald 
Times 21 March 2000, 5. 
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 In recent years, partnerships have led to positive changes. In order to achieve 
optimal success, however, the full support of Saskatchewan communities is needed. 
Neighboring communities need to be committed to working together and building on 
their economic strengths collectively.  If that commitment is not there it is difficult for 
the government to get involved.  Ultimately CED is a partnership that requires many 
organizations and individuals to work together. It is imperative that the individuals who 
come together have both the right skills and the right spirit. The right skills are planning 
and entrepreneurial skills; the right spirit is a fundamental belief in the importance of the 
region on a whole to succeed. Moreover, it is imperative that all orders of government 
recognize this and contribute in various ways to achieve various reforms. If they do not, 
the overall capacity of the REDAs will plateau and their effect on CED will continue to 
be sub-optimal. 
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APPENDIX “A”:  EXAMPLES FOR THE 7 COMMUNITY ECONONMIC DEVELOPMENT 
(CED) CORE SERVICES  
 
Source: Regional Economic Development Authority: Core Funding Guidelines 2006-07 to 2008-09 
(Regina: Saskatchewan Regional Economic and Co-operative Development, 2006), 3. 
 
Co-ordination: 
• preparing regional CED co-ordination strategies; 
• co-ordinating regional CED stakeholders' and clients' interests, activities, initiatives, projects, 
etc.; 
• improving the co-ordination and delivery of federal, provincial and regional programs and 
services; 
• activities which enable REDA communities, economic stakeholders and residents to establish 
trust, work together, co-operate, identify joint opportunities, establish public participation 
processes, etc.; 
• regional, inter-municipal and community meetings; 
• regional pilot projects and community collaboration initiatives; 
• attendance and presentations at senior government hearings, workshops, seminars, etc.; and 
• public forums, public hearings, etc. 
 
Organizational Development and Planning: 
• expanding REDA membership and participation; 
• preparing and implementing regional organizational development, co-operation and coordination 
strategies;  
• to establish and incorporate businesses, co-operatives and community economic development 
organizations, etc.;  
• to provide assistance, guidance and other support to co-operatives, businesses and development 
organizations, in their organizational development, operation and expansion activities; 
• regional economic development plans and strategies;  
• regional community economic development service plans; and 
• providing planning services and products (e.g., strategic and business planning advice) to 
businesses, co-operatives and development organizations. 
 
Education and Training: 
• preparing, implementing, operating, and attending education and training initiatives, workshops, 
seminars, etc.; 
• preparing regional education and training strategies; 
• REDA board member and staff training; 
• regional conferences and workshops; 
• business and co-operative education and training; and 
• labour force training. 
 
Information: 
• planning, implementation, management, and delivery of regional and community information 
programs and services;  
• preparing regional information plans, strategies and inventories; 
• the dissemination of information; and 
• preparing and providing co-operative and business information. 
 
 
Research & Development: 
• investigating, analysing and developing options, comparisons and solutions to regional problems, 
issues, constraints, and development opportunities, and conducting research and development 
services for clients; 
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• preparing regional research and development strategies; 
• conducting surveys; 
• identifying and analysing regional, community and client needs, opinions, opportunities, issues 
and constraints; 
• research and development programs and services for business, co-operatives, development 
organizations and communities; 
• economic and development feasibility and cost-benefit studies; 
• demographic analyses; 
• market analyses; and 
• sectoral and other strategic analyses. 
 
Promotion and Marketing: 
• promoting and marketing the REDA, region, communities, and development opportunities 
including promotion and marketing services to clients: 
• preparing and implementing regional promotion and marketing plans, strategies, activities and 
services; 
• promotional materials; 
• preparation and distribution of regional and community demographic, industrial and labour force 
profiles and statistics; 
• development and diversification opportunities; 
• marketing services and programs to and for businesses, co-operatives and communities; 
• conducting and attending trade shows and conferences; 
• developing and implementing procurement initiatives; and 
• conducting "Buy Locally" campaigns. 
 
Local Initiative and Project Management Assistance: 
• providing local initiative and project management assistance; 
• specific regional and community initiatives; 
• services which support and assist entrepreneurs and co-operatives in identifying and managing 
specific development projects from the idea stage through to the completion stage; 
• identifying, negotiating and managing development projects internal and external to the region; 
• conducting feasibility studies; and 
• assisting in identifying sources of funding for initiatives and projects. 
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